Civil war: the war to mess up all war; or violence, the state, and violence against the state.

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Today I have got the priviledge to share with you some observations on civil war and the state. We all know that today war means civil war; the real existing war is, and will probably remain for the foreseeable future, civil war. In a seminar on 'the war of the philosophers' it seems to me to be pertinent to ask whether new questions, perspectives, or perhaps even answer to old questions of war can be imagined from the distinct perspective of civil war, that is from the particular perspective of war in our times. I will highlight a few points on violence, subjectivity and space, all analysed within the framework of citizens attacking the state. The points I will make are part of a large exploration of space and civil war; my purpose will not be to reach a general conclusion, but rather to raise some issues for further discussion.

Although the state is seen by most observers as a defining element of civil war the understanding of *the state itself* is often narrow and descriptive. The existing literature on civil war often has a rather limited vision, focusing on the parts and the splitting but almost completely ignoring the whole, and more often than not purely descriptive with very little interpretative power. I will argue that civil war compels social scientists and philosophers to ask new questions about the state, which are pertinent also to states without civil war: What is the 'glue' that make citizens stick together even in deeply divided societies? Which historical forces can dissolve this glue? Where are states likely to fragment? In order to understand civil war better the way to go is rethinking state-theory. A theory of civil war with an ambition of both generality and interpretative power must be 'holistic' and keep alive all three components: the *whole*, the *splitting*, and the *parts*.

Rephrased in a more general way, to see what civil war can tell us about war in general we have to confront our image of civil war with the basic questions of *subjectivity* ('the glue'), *violence* ('the solvent'), and *space* ('the lines of fracture'). The problems of subjectivity and of violence points to the paradox of agency and

structure: how shall we grasp the subjectivity of any one person simultaneously agent of her or his own life and subject to the structures of society? How can we interpret violence as simultaneously individual acts and acts of a historical subject like the state? One direction of investigation gaining increased importance in the 1990s is to map the interaction of subjectivity and violence in *space*, to map the *spatiality* of the social phenomena of subjectivity and violence. In the works that I will discuss briefly below, state *territory* and human *body* are taken as the two spatial poles by which to navigate the dark waters of the agency-structure paradox.

Civil war is a self-contradictory term. How can war be civil; how can the civil be war? The British political thinker John Keane argues that we should drop the term 'civil war' in favour of 'uncivil war', and he says "It would be a scandalous euphemism to call them *civil* wars... today's battle zones are best described as *a new type of uncivil war."* (Keane, 1996:137; italics in original). But is that a good solution? On the face of it, 'uncivil war' has a somewhat platitudal ring; in a broad sense any war is 'uncivil', and thus the distinction between war as a general phenomenon and civil war as a particular phenomenon is lost. *Civil war, guerre civile, guerra civil, Bürgerkrieg, borgerkrig, inbördeskrig, grasjdanskij voina*; they all keep the contradiction between civil and war. I think it is important to keep the contradiction, because it is here civil war can tell us something about ourselves as citizens.

How does civil become war? Not by annihilating civility or the civilians, or even civilisation, but by revealing the complementarity of *civitas* and violence. To grasp the historical phenomena of civil wars it is important not just to concentrate on their terrifying, bloody, violent features. Civil war should not be equated with Hobbes' brutish stateless condition. Even the most horrible recent slaughters in Rwanda were not just that; they also revealed the *civitas* of Rwanda.

The antonym to war is not civil but peace; and the antonym to civil is not war but military: civil-military, and war-peace. Just as civil war questions the externality of war to the *civitas*, it also questions the divide of military matters from civil life. In a sharp and wonderfully wide-ranging critique of Clausewitz's thinking on war as an ethnocentric reflection of nineteenth century regimental culture with its extreme isolation of the soldier from European society, the famous military historian John Keegan writes,

> "What [Clausewitz's 'war as the continuation of policy'] made no allowance for at all was war without beginning or end, the endemic warfare of non-state, even pre-state peoples...
> In short, it is at the cultural level that Clausewitz's answer to his question, What is war?, is defective.... war embraces much more than politics: that it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself." (Keegan, 1993:11)

Not only non-state or pre-state peoples experienced endemic warfare. Civil-war is a contemporary example of war fundamentally transgressing Clausewitz' notion of war as a continuation of politics, but becoming culture itself. In a messy assault civil war breaks down the water-tight separation of soldiers from civilians and ruins the notions of a polar difference between civil and military or society and war; cherished as it was, both by the regimental officer and the pacifist.

Civil war is not just violence amongst humans, individuals, but people bonded in a particular way by war. They are part of a community, and not any community, but of a state; they are interpellated persons, 'civilised' human beings being always-already part of a *civitas*.

All definitions of civil war can be summed up in three components: the parts, the splitting, and the whole.[1] Modern sociological or current cultural attempts at an explanation of civil war have started with the parts (the individual rebel or primordial ethnic group), proceeded to the splitting up (the rebellious assertion of frustrated individuality and age-old ethnic hatred), but rarely spent too much energy on the whole because "society" was taken as an linear sociological or historical aggregate of individuals and 'groups'.[2] In my view, however, the whole would serve better as the point of departure for an attempt to unravel the contradiction between civil and war: How can you be part of a community and at the same time wage war against it; what are the historical and structural limits to internal violence before the unity of the *civitas* breaks down?

Nation and national unity cannot be taken for granted but often are in circular arguments like the United States or England escaped undivided from their civil wars because they were strong nations. But what constitutes the cohesiveness of a national entity despite and beyond the ravage of civil war? How can the nation state be an entity when it is deeply divided by war? What is the source of the civic strength that can bond a war and keep it a civil war? And on the other hand, what can make the bond snap and turn civil war into interstate war? Or how can a re-united entity emerge from a cessation of hostilities? All these questions point to a general struggle between citizens and the state of which civil war is only the most extreme manifestation. The three parameters of this struggle: violence, subjectivity, and space, are among the core philosophical issues of war;below I shall touch upon a few of them.

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1 Or faction, war, and country: "Civil War: A war between political factions or regions in a country."; *Webster's Encyclopeadic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*. New York: Random House, 1989. Carl Schmitt defined civil war in similar simple terms: "War is armed combat between organized political entities; civil war is armed combat within an organised unit." (Schmitt, 1996:32)

2 Paradigmatic is Ted Robert Gurr's first book, *Why Men Rebel*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.

1. Violence different from power

To me Hannah Arendt's distinction between violence and power is basic for any discussion of violence, and I find it very unfortunate that her essay on violence is more or less ignored by the current research (even now when other parts of her work are receiving renewed attention). In *On Violence* she wrote,

> "Behind the apparent confusion [of the precise meaning of power and violence] is a firm conviction in whose light all distinctions would be, at best, of minor importance: the conviction that the most crucial political issue is, and has always been, the question of Who rules Whom? Power, strength, force, authority, violence - these are but words to indicate the means by which man rules over man; they are held to be synonyms because they have the same function. It is only after one ceases to reduce public affairs to the business of dominion that the original data in the realm of human affairs will appear, or, rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity." (Arendt, 1970:43),

and she continued,

> "To sum up: politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance." (ibid., p. 56)

With Hannah Arendt's important distinction between power and violence, we can begin to see that violence in social affairs cannot be a continuation of power in Foucault's sense, but rather it's opposite. Hannah Arendt would not agree that power is "a multiform production of relations of domination" (Foucault, 1980:143), stressing as she does that power springs from "the human ability to act in concert" (Arendt, 1970:44).

For Arendt to rescue power from the non-political realm of violence is a restoration of the political project of republicanism. Throughout her book she stresses that people can act in concert and constitute a republic, and thus has a responsibility to do so. She evokes the Athenian *polis* and the Roman *civitas* and the eighteenth century revolutionaries that,

> ".. had in mind a concept of power and law whose essence did not rely on the command-obedience relationship [but]... constituted a form of government, a republic, where the rule of law, resting on the power of the people, would put an end to the rule of man over man, which they thought was 'a government fit for slaves.'" (Arendt, 1970:40)

In my estimate her distinction of power and violence not only reveals what must be the true politics of power: republicanism, as it has been developed amongst others by Jürgen Habermas; it also allows us to gauge the 'pre-discursive' structure

of violence. John Keane's definition of violence in his essay *Reflections on Violence* perfectly captures this pre- or non-discursive quality,

> "Violence is the unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others.. death is the potentially ultimate consequence of violence." (Keane, 1996:67)

Keane adds, and I quote approvingly,

> "..I want to insist on the need to preserve its [violence's] original and essential core meaning, untainted by loose metaphorical allusions.. or unhindered by questions of motivation.. or legality." (Keane, 1996:66)

Keane could have referred to Carl Schmitt on this point, arguing for a very similar non-discursive, or as he puts it, 'existential' definition of violence or 'combat' in his famous book *The Concept of the Political*, from 1932,

> "Just as the term enemy, the word combat, too, is to be understood in its original existential sense...The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy." (Schmitt, 1996:33)

2. Violence as constructive

In the 1950s and 1960s Konrad Lorentz and behavioral science suggested a fundamentally ahistorical answer to the problem of violence in human affairs by reductive analogies with our animal present. In her essay *On Violence* Hannah Arendt, in my opinion, effectively demolished the behavioralistic study of violence, fashionable at the time. In the early 1970s Johan Galtung became famous for locating violence in the over-all structure of society.

> "I see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible."[3]

Paradoxically, both the behaviouralistic and the peace research concepts of violence, despite all their polar political implications, shared a level of generality which made their efforts to explain the function of violence in human society equally unable to grasp historical specificity. Johan Galtung has since extended his already very broad definition of violence from 1969 into all-pervading 'structural' and 'cultural' forms,

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[3] Galtung, 1990:292; summarising his important 1969-article, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol 6, no 3, 1969.

> "Direct violence is an *event*; structural violence is a *process* with ups and downs; cultural violence is an *invariant*, a 'permanence'." (*Journal of Peace Research*, vol 27, no 3, 1990, p. 291)

In my view this is the wrong way to go. While Galtung deserves credit for insisting on the social dimension of violence amidst the beastly howling of behavioral science and the prudent silence of the humanities, in his latest blown-up version 'violence' has become just another word for inequality or injustice, and thus left with little historical explanatory power. The concept of violence needs to be trimmed down as proposed by Arendt, not extended, in order to interpret the specifities of violence. If Galtung started with a pre-conceived conclusion: inequality in all disguises is violence, a new generation of anthropologists have started with the productive question: how does violence constitute multiple, ordered social inequalities? From a status as an ahistorical condition of human affairs either found in the human genes or in the deep invariant structure of human society violence has come to be regarded as a historically constitutive aspect of human society. Violence no longer could be understood solely as destruction of the social fabric but demanded serious attention as the stuff it's made of. Summing up this sea-change American anthropologist and specialist on Andean social structure Deborah Poole wrote,

> "Many social scientists have begun the task of rethinking [the] traditional divide between violence and social order. No longer seen as a merely destructive or "anti-social" force, violence, as a form of power, has come to be viewed as productive of subjectivities, truths, histories, and identities - productive, in short, of the social order itself." (Poole, 1994:1)

Considering this new agenda it is a surprising fact that we find no concise definition of violence in these works. Definitions of violence start off from the physical use of force against humans, but unfortunately hurry on to add discursive predicates of legitimacy. Yet, to understand violence we must *empty* it of meaning. What we need is a definition of violence *without* discourse, *before* discourse, in order to examine how violence constitutes the *space* available to discourse, to politics, to legitimacy, but not of discourse, politics, or legitimacy *itself*: As Allan Feldman writes in his book on political violence in Northern Ireland, "The surfaces - those sites, stages, and templates upon which history is constructed as a cultural object." (Feldman, 1991:2) We should ask *where* violence hit the flesh before we ask why, before interpreting how meaning creates out of violence an event, a cultural artefact. Let me add, not to be misunderstood, that no violence ever is meaning-less; the space of violence is always filled with significance, but, and this is the point I want to make, violence and significance are not the same, they are not identical. To understand them we should pull apart analytically what historical time pulls together into one event.

Allan Feldman's work on Northern Ireland is an extremely subtle and persuasive example of cultural anthropology lying bare how violence fragments the territory of Belfast into ethnic-sectarian sanctuaries separated by violent interfaces. The event of violence is what he calls a cultural artefact generating its own universe. In his view a plurality of agencies construct and deconstruct the unified individual person in multiple relations of power, dominance, and violence. But as the human 'individuality' dissolves as a possible focus for analysis, the physical presence of the human body in the violent space of Belfast becomes the locus to be analysed. "I look to bodily, spatial, and violent practices as forming a unified language of material signification." (Feldman, 1991:1) Unfortunately, but characteristic of anthropology, I am afraid, Feldman almost totally ignores how the British state (and the Irish state) frames the conflict by reflecting pressure from the system of states into the local dynamics. We must next turn to the question of violence creating states.

3. Violence creating states

We need to move beyond the general question of violence as constitutive of human society to the specific question of how violence creates *states*. Two fundamentally different approaches have been followed in order to answer this question. The active subject of violence is either perceived as the *person* in a society of humans or as the *state* in a society of states. The former approach has been the choice of political science, sociology, and to some extent of anthropology, constituting violence in a 'negative' mode, as *rule* internally in the state. The latter approach has traditionally been the reserve of international relations theory, constituting violence in a positive mode, as *war* externally to the state. While the space of the violent society in the former approach went from minute social groups of families and neighbourhoods up to the state, the space in the latter approach went from a simple friend-enemy grouping of two states up to the global society (system) of states.

Following Max Weber the functional sociological approach is to see the state from the bottom up as the apex of differentiated social and political institutions with the state as the locus of the legitimate monopoly of violence, used negatively against the violence emanating from society whether ultimately stemming from animal aggressiveness in man or social inequalities. From this perspective war is an aberration from civilised statehood, very much like violence is understood as an individual aberration in a civilised society. A recent example of this line of argument is Manus Midlarsky's book on Inequality and the origins of war and states (1999).

A radically different approach is to view the state as a warring subject, a sovereignty-maintaining member of a state-system, and thus understand sub-state groups and institutions *top-down*, premised on the iron law of states: the distinction

between friend and enemy.[4] One of the principal advantages of the top-down approach, in my opinion, is to reconnect conceptually violence external and internal to the state. 'Historical-' or 'macro-' sociologists such as Charles Tilly and Michael Mann has successfully broken the icy crust separating the global drama of states at war from the internal horror of violent groups.[5] Charles Tilly sees war as the essential engine of European (world?) history. His book *Coercion, Capital and States in Europe 900-1992,*

> "..takes up the problem [of state formation] where Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan, and Lewis Mumford left it... by placing the organisation of coercion and preparation for war squarely in the middle of analysis, arguing in its rasher moments that state structure appeared chiefly as a by-product of rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war; and second by insisting that relations among states, especially through war and preparation for war, strongly affected the entire process of state-formation." (Tilly, 1992:14)

The full theoretical implications of the primacy of war takes one, in my view, logically to a neo-Hegelian notion of state subjectivity. Thomas Højrup's book *Omkring livsformsanalysens udvikling* ["Towards the development of the analysis of life-forms"] is the most elaborate, if hermetic, formulation of this neo-Hegelian anti-realist and anti-sociological standpoint yet published in Denmark. Analytically, in this position, the state comes before society: the state is not a product of society, but society is a product of the state. But 'the state' only in a very specific spatial meaning. Pierre Clastres, in his path-breaking work on war in primitive societies, characterises the space of a community in a fashion applicable also to states,

> "The community is thus more than the sum of its groups, and this establishes it as a political unity. The political unity of the community is inscribed in the *spatial unity of the habitat*: the people who belong to the same community live together in the same place... The exclusivity in the use of the territory implies a movement of exclusion, and here the properly political dimension of primitive society as a community including its essential relationship to the territory clearly appears: the existence of the Other is immediately posited in the act that excludes him; it is against the other community that each society asserts its exclusive right to a determined territory." (Clastres, 1994:153; italics added)

Now, the point of Clastre's analysis[6] was to show how war in primitive society prevents the development of the state, by which he understood a community divided into Master and Subjects.

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4 "The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political...The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy." (Schmitt, 1996:19,26)

5 Tilly, 1975 and 1990; Mann, 1986; Giddens, 1985.

6 See also his extended analysis in *La Société Contre l'état*, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974.

> "What is a state? It is the total sign of division in society, in that it is a separate organ of political power: society is henceforth divided into those who exercise power and those who submit to it" (Clastres, 1994:165)

However, the point today is not to debate whether or not the warring primitive society was a state, but highlight how the modern state combines the spatial characteristic of primitive society and the structural feature which Clastres argued negated primitive society: it is both a spatially bonded, warring unity *and* an internally divided society. It is precisely this duality which civil war brings into focus by contesting the unity of space and the division of rule. We should turn next to the question of rule, or with the term Althusser used, interpellation.

4. Violence and subjects , interpellation

Civil war confronts state-theory with the puzzling question: how can the 'dependent subjects' suddenly become independent and turn against the structuralist iron-grip of the state? It may seem ironic to seek an answer to this question in the work of the arch-structuralist Althusser, nevertheless he does provide part of an answer. For Althusser *interpellation* is the process by which the state creates its subjects as subjects. He sees the limits of state power and thus the possibility of revolution in the limits of ideology. I will argue, however, that the crucial point is that *the space* of the state, of interpellation, is limited, and the violence creating the limits in reality, are outside of ideology, of interpellation. The policeman's hail, Althusser's famous example of ideology, works only inside the cultural sphere of the national community, within the reach of the law. The boundary is created by the war amongst states and not by ideology. Central to my use of Althusser is his insistence on the non-identity between state and citizenry, and violence as the basic condition of state-citizen relations. The state force people to become citizens, overtly violently by repression, or covertly violently by 'ideology' (I will refrain from defining 'ideology'; at this point it simply means 'not violently repressive'). Because interpellation works most of the time and the citizenry says "Yes, it is our state" the state don't have to kill. But if interpellation breaks down, and citizens say "No" and threatens the survival of the state, that is its survival in the struggle against *other* states, the state will kill citizens in the last instance. Democracy can approximate state-citizen identity, but never remove violence as the bedrock relation between state and citizens.

What is still hidden is how to unlock the paradox of the state being both external to the citizens and nothing but the totality of citizens, or put differently, the relation of state (nation, citizens) and government (state-power, state-apparatus). A revolution in the exploration of violence between man and state gathered

momentum in the 1980s inspired by Michel Foucault's spatial work on power and resistance.

5. Violence and space

Foucault was not alone in investigating social space. In 1957 Gaston Bachelard published his pioneering *La poétique de l'espace*; Henri Lefebvre's book *La Production de l'espace* (1974) has been influential (and more so after its translation into English 1991) for the *Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* , the title of Edward Soja's programmatic book from 1989. Besides Soja the social production of space has been investigated as by Marxist and post-Marxist geographers like Derek Gregory and David Harvey.[7]

In his large and varied *oeuvre*, it is in his writings from the mid-1970s that Foucault most profoundly explores the spatiality of power and dominance. For Althusser state-power was expression of a Subject interpellating subjects. Foucault expressly rejected this view and did not talk of interpellation but of domination, limited in the sense that it did not refer to a Subject, to a centre. Foucault's rejection of any kind of central repressive agency, his insistence that in the centre of the carceral city one will find no Subject, no will, no plan, but a multitude of strategies and relations of power, is an important step for a theory of the state capable of grasping civil war because it insists that the space where power is articulated is heterogenic, multi polar, and bodily. Power should not be understood as a relation between an active subject oppressing a passive object, but as a *multitude* of struggles between the power of discipline and the power of resistance,

> "There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised." (ibid., p. 143).

I would say that the state *is* the totality of these points; logically, the state can only be encountered by the citizen as de-centred practices. Experienced by the individual citizen inside the nation-state there is no space, sphere, or territory, fully and exclusively 'the state', but a heterogenic field with a multitude of clashes between the state and all the numerous sub-state groups of which the individual person is a member (family, professional union, religious community, etc.) The notion of the state should be de-institutionalised. Seen from inside the nation, the state is a multitude, but never a totality, of institutions, rules, practices and so on. There is no state outside, beyond or behind the points where relations of power are exercised. The state is not somewhere, rattling like a dry kernel inside the nut-shell

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[7] A perceptive use of spatial theory is John Western's critical analysis of apartheid Cape Town; in particular chapter 3, 'The dialectic of person and place' ; Western, 1981.

of society. It is important to note, finally, that only in *interstate* interaction is the state present as the *totality* of these clashes. Only in the extreme external interaction, war, is the oneness of State and society manifest; ironically reversing Clastres' dictum on primitive society-state relations, claiming that "the best enemy of the State is war" (Clastres, 1994:166). In post-primitive societies to the contrary, Schmitt's conclusion seems to be valid: only in war is the State fully existing.[8]

6. Civil war defined as citizens attacking the state.

Three parameters of the state-citizen opposition stand out from the brief review above: violence, subjectivity, and space. *Violence* was defined by space and subjectivity: between two states it was war, between state and citizen is was a relation of rule and resistance. The *space* of the state-citizen opposition was clearly polarised in the human body and the state territory; there was no violence not touching the body, and no state without a territory. *Subjectivity* spanned from the human individual to the state. Man was understood as subject, citizen, individual etc. How to conceptualise the subjectivity of the state was a major problem, suggestions ranged from a neo-Hegelian historical subjectivity to the decentered a-historical subjectivity suggested by Foucault and many others. Obviously there are many intermediate 'actors' between man and state, different groups of people including various state-apparatuses, for example the army.

Register	Man	State
Subjectivity	CITIZEN ----------	GOVERNMENT
Space	BODY----------	TERRITORY
Violence	RULE/RESITANCE----------	WAR

Interpellation is always violent in the last instance. Between the state and the citizen or any group of citizens, a condition of potential or explosive violence reigns. This is a common condition to all states. When it comes to survival the state will use violence against its citizens. Of course, "the question, how much difference a political system can tolerate and still survive," (du Toit, 1996:6) is answered differently by each historical state. We like to think a democratic state is strong because it can accommodate opposition, while a totalitarian state cracks like glass, or that even state-rule can be abolished altogether by a proper dose of civil society

8 "In its entirety the state as an organized political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction...An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity." Schmitt, 1996:29.

communitarism. Yet, no state is likely to survive *without* violence as a recourse in the most extreme situations.

Civil war can be thus defined in the most general terms by relations of attack and defence between state and subject. Attack is conditional, but defence is unconditional. The subject defending itself against state-violence proves its will to exist. This is the relation of violence in a nation-state in 'peaceful' historic conditions. However, during a *civil war* the attacker/defender relation becomes ambiguous and may be reversed. When subjects violently contest interpellation and the state defends itself against attacks from sub-state groups, they wage civil war.

Thomas Højrup took 'the superiority of the defence' to be a conclusive argument why war between states does not lead to a single world-state, but remains a 'true infinity' of a multi-polar state-system. Let us for a moment transpose his argument on the superiority of defensive over offensive war[9] to the *internal* situation between the state and subjects (sub-state groups). The parallel to the world-state would be the absolute totalitarian state, but that has never been. Foucault said the state is never able totally to conquer the subjects because at every point where power is exercised resistance is formed. Hannah Arendt located the weakness of offensive violence in power, in the denial of legitimacy to violence.

> "No government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed. Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs a power basis - the secret police and its net of informers." (Arendt, 1970:50)

The notion of the superiority of the defence adds precision to that statement. There is a strategic depth - a defensive force - in the interpellated sub-state groups. When soldiers don't obey orders and refuse to open fire on an unarmed demonstration, the marchers are protected by the superiority of the defence. When people in the Soviet Union listened to prohibited western radio they struggled successfully against the state protected by the strategic depth of a million homes. But again in parallel to the 'real' war, the superiority of the defence does not mean that interpellation cease to function, except, perhaps in the parallel to total war, total anarchy: everyone against everyone.

Resistance to interpellation implies that a front is established between the state and sub-state groups. We normally see violence in the state-citizen relation as the exemption, and not as the norm because the state pauses in its use of violence. The modern 'civil society' notion is a whole theory built on pauses in violence.

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[9] "An attacking subject can thus only deploy the forces freely available for mobilization, while a defending subject can deploy the forces freely available for mobilization plus its purely defensive forces." Højrup, 1995:144.[trans. H.T.]

> "Even if war by its mere possibility is always virtually present, it is such a crucial feature of war that it ends, that we regard the *pauses* of war to be the normal condition of the world, and the war itself as breakdowns of this condition."
> (Højrup, 1995:146; trans. H.T.).

Civil war seems to question the body-state polarity of all three registers of subjectivity, space and violence. Somehow civil war is in-between and going beyond the state, undermining the digital concept of state violence as either rule inside or war outside the state border. In order to interpret civil war beyond the simple dichotomy of attack and defence of state rule, I suggest returning to the distinction between power and violence and from that point search the vast 'strategic terrain' between human body and state territory for intermediate spatial structures: the social fronts of attack and defence in civil war.

Conclusion

Let us conclude with a return to Hannah Arendt. When Foucault spoke of power, I will argue with Arendt that we should hear *violence*, and when he talked of knowledge and discourse we could hear *power*. The concepts do not overlap completely, however. Power as used by Foucault is not always violent and knowledge extends beyond power as the term is used by Arendt. I shall use Arendt's distinction between violence and power, which, in my estimate, adds a precision to Foucault's use of 'power'. At the end of the day, the real difference between Arendt and Foucault is not semantic, but lie in the trust they put in human agency to deal with power, in the inherent sovereignty of man. Foucault does not share Arendt's republican hope for the 'group acting in concert', i.e. the genesis and reproduction of the self-declared space for representing and executing political power within states, and he writes,

> "One might thus contrast two major systems of approach to the analysis of power: in the first place, there is the old system found in the philosophes of the eighteenth century. The concept of power as an original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the contract, as the matrix of political power, provide its point of articulation...
> In contrast, the other system of approach no longer tries to analyse political power according to the schema of contract-oppression, but in accordance with that of war-repression...
> On this view, repression is none other than the realisation, within the continual warfare of this pseudo-peace, of a perpetual relationship of force... the pertinent opposition is not between the legitimate and illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and submission." (Foucault, 1980:91,92)

But is this an instrumental view of power, is it is domination to achieve an end? There is no will behind this power. I think it is very much "the essence of all

government" as Arendt says. Arendt speaks of an acting humanity, that 'constitute a government; support the laws; give their consent; have an opinion; assume responsibility' (Arendt, 1970:40,49). About as far as Foucault goes in considering agency or a space for politics is the remark, quoted above, "There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised." (Foucault, 1980:143) Unfortunately he does not elaborate on this. The roar of battle is heard only in the very last sentence of *Surveiller et punir*. It seems to be very hard indeed to break out of the carceral city. Today we see that messy civil wars rather than revolutions break down the walls of states and ruin the apparatus of surveillance; instead of resistance to power we witness the feeble refugee succumb to the militia, with horror we must acknowledge that the roar of battle does not bring freedom.