AID UNDER FIRE IN SOMALIA

A REPORT

from the research project,

Major constraints for the peace-inducing impact of humanitarian aid in complex emergencies.

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May 1999

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Preface

The Council for Development Research initiated this project in February 1998. I began working in September 1998 for a two-year period based at DUPI, Danish Institute of International Affairs, and Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus. Beyond official documents, letters and internal reports practically nothing was written on the subject of Danish humanitarian aid. A large-scale evaluation of Danish humanitarian assistance in the period 1992 - 1998 is currently underway in Danida. I hope to benefit from their findings in my next report. In the present report, the first of three, the theoretical discussion has been reduced to a minimum, pending a completion of the empirical investigation. I have enjoyed including fragments of a number of interviews, to give some of the actors a voice in this report.

Everyone I have approached in the course of my work have been most co-operative; my thanks goes to them.

Let us not forget that humanitarian aid is one of the outer ramparts dividing the rich and poor continents of the world. Abukar Sheikh Ali, my Mogadishu host, business-man and DBG project co-ordinator expressed it like this:

“Somalia and Denmark have same number of people. Well, if you gave us the richest half of your population we would give you the poorest half of our population; then I think we could solve our problems!”
Acronyms

DBG Diakonia-Bread for the world-Germany
DCA Dan Church Aid (= FKN - Folkekirkens Nødhjælp)
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
DRC Danish Red Cross (= DRK - Dansk Røde Kors)
DRC Danish Refugee Council (= DF - Dansk Flygtningehjælp)
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (= UM-Udenrigsministeriet, Copenhagen)
SACB Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body
SCF Save the Children Fund
SEOC Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium
SRCS Somalia Red Crescent Society
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nation’s Children Fund
UNOSOM United Nation’s Operation in Somalia
UNRISD United Nations Research Insitute for Social Development
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
I. Executive summary

A. Introduction

The purpose of the project is to assess which forms of aid in complex emergencies are most effective, defined as their peace-inducing capacity. The aim of the project is not to produce an evaluation report but rather to identify some key policy dilemmas. In pursuing this objective the project will map the constraints to Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia in 1992 and 1997.

Six Danish humanitarian aid donations to Somalia were selected for this report.

1/1992 Danish Red Cross/ICRC/IFRC (16 mill. dkk)
2/1992 Dan Church Aid (20 mill. dkk)
3/1997 Danish Red Cross/ICRC/IFRC (5 mill. dkk),
4/1997 Dan Church Aid (1,5 mill. dkk)
5/1997 UNHCR (5 mill. dkk)
6/1997 Danish Refugee Council (4 mill. dkk)

The selected projects represent 35 % of the total official humanitarian aid given to Somalia in 1992 and 76 % of the total official humanitarian aid given to Somalia in 1997.

The ambition was to follow the seven selected projects from their beginning as appeals to their effects on the ground in Somalia. As donations in most cases were pooled with donations from other countries it has not always been possible or reasonable to specify implementations of Danish donations alone.

In the period November 1988-January 1999 I visited Hargeisa and Mogadishu, but not Kismayo for security reasons as heavy fighting broke out in Juba in early December 1998 at the time of my visit. I did one field-trip to nomads living to the south of Hargeisa and two field-trips out of Mogadishu, one to small villages in the Qorioley district in Lower Shebelle and one to small villages in the Jowhar district in Middle Shebelle; still my direct contact with the intended beneficiaries was limited.

I was accompanied on my visit to Somaliland by the chairman of “Det Somaliske Folk i Danmark” Mr. Rage Haji Mohamad Rage which greatly facilitated my contact with various Somaliland officials, business people, and intellectuals. I met no-one in aid agencies and departments that had worked with emergency aid in Somalia in 1992 still doing that five or six years later.
B. Constraints of donations
The money donated to humanitarian aid to a certain population at risk is the first limit of Denmark’s commitment, i.e. the first major constraint of the impact of humanitarian aid.

The Foreign Ministry Department of Humanitarian Aid had no documentation of the criteria for decisions to fund individual projects. There was neither time nor staff for a critical evaluation of requests for emergency aid or to exercise the necessary control. The Ministry had to rely almost totally on appeals coming to them; they could only in a very limited way initiate relief. Another indication of the staff constraint was the difficulty for the Ministry to revise the proposed budgets in any substantial manner.

In March 1992 Mr. Johs. Dahl-Hansen, MFA took the unusual initiative in dealing with the escalating crisis in Eastern and Southern Africa to suggest that Denmark should contribute a sum of 100 mill. dkk. A key justification for the unprecedented final appropriation of 120 mill. dkk to African emergencies was the linking of civil wars in East Africa with drought in Southern Africa. In the official appeal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed 60 million Africans were in immediate danger of starvation. Most of the money donated went to Danish farmers selling their surplus produce to WFP.
C. Constraints of delivery

i) Inaccurate identification in the appeals of the dimensions of need.

| Box 5. Summary of agency-responses to Somalia emergencies in 1992 and 1997: |
| dimensions of the emergency as presented in appeals |
| 1992/ICRC | 4,5; 1,5+3,5; 1,5; >1,0 million Somalis starving |
| 1992/DCA | no dimensions; “thousands”; 4,5 mill. Somalis starving |
| 1997/ICRCa | no dimensions of flood emergency needs |
| 1997/DCAa | 800,000 affected and 200,000 displaced by floods |
| 1997/ICRCb | no dimensions of rehabilitation needs |
| 1997/DCAb | no dimensions of rehabilitation needs |
| 1997/UNHCR | 446,560 Somali refugees in the region |
| 1997/DRC | 280,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia |

Estimates of the number of people in danger of starvation in Somalia in 1992 differed wildly pointing to three key problems with needs assessments,

i) An emergency does not count without a figure of people in need; the press, agencies, ministries etc. demand figures no matter how inaccurate.

ii) The margin of uncertainty both conceptually and numerically may be so wide as to render estimates almost meaningless.

iii) Estimates tend to be inflated over time reflecting that big numbers are better than small numbers for most parties to an emergency.

The ICRC estimate of “more than 1 million” starving Somalis seems to be the most plausible, but the degree of accuracy is impossible to ascertain. The claim of 4,5 million starving Somalis circulating in the international press, in NGO appeals and government declarations almost certainly was a gross exaggeration.

Firstly, because the total population of Somalia in 1992 was below 5 million. Secondly, the area affected by food deficit was limited to the southern inter-riverine area, and not even here were everybody starving. Thirdly, different definitions of ‘starving’ glossed over the striking difference between the estimates.
To add another million starving people just to present a really juicy fund-generating emergency is not an act of mercy but an act of de-humanizing. It has disturbing implications for the human rights of the beneficiaries confronted with the aid industry.

Inaccurate estimates hamper timely relief. The appeals gave no reasons for the amounts of aid proposed but moved on the unstated understanding that needs anyway were much larger than the possible emergency assistance. An evaluation of Bob Koepp's SEOC (1995) severely criticizes the focus on inputs as a sufficient measure of success “Measuring success by input marginalises questions of relevance and effect. The result is a tendency to treat the requirement of food as either self-evident or a generalised requirement.”

The 1997 flood response appeals provide accurate assessment (of a much smaller emergency than 1992) facilitating the planning of a well-targeted emergency relief. However, it is significant that almost no public funds were generated for the flood relief. The sober assessments could not move the flood emergency to the top of the global 1997 chart of hit-emergencies.

It is notable that no assessment of needs was made in connection with the rehabilitation/development assistance. This is a reflection of a very important and contentious difference between emergencies and development. In 1997 Somalia no longer was an emergency (except for the floods). I argue that a fundamental redirection of needs-assessments had taken place from people to institutions. The response to needs of people living in ‘normal’ conditions however volatile and vulnerable were converted into departmentalized state-like inputs, for example in terms of primary health targets or areas of agricultural rehabilitation or programmes of education.

Finally the dimensions of the refugee-crisis were assessed very accurately in terms of displaced persons, while assessments of the rehabilitation inputs were vague and departmentalized. This reflects again, I think, the difference of assessments concerned with people-needs and institution-inputs.
ii) Improper identification in the appeals of the causes of emergency

Box 7. Summary of agency-responses to Somalia emergencies in 1992 and 1997: causes of the emergency as presented in appeals

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<td>Conflict (in one appeal drought)</td>
<td>Drought (in one appeal conflict)</td>
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<th>1997/UNHCR</th>
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<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Internal clan fighting</td>
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\[a: \text{flood-response Nov-Dec 1997; b: rehabilitation Jan-Dec 1997.}\]

I argue that the famine in 1992 was attributed in an improper way to drought by DCA and Danida. Asked directly if the drought was the cause of the 1992 famine Berhard Helander, one of the world’s top Somalia experts, answered, “Absolutely not!” This conclusion is supported by many researchers. Indeed, the same conclusion on the causes of the famine in 1992 was reached already by the reports from Somalia made in 1992. The ICRC never talked about a drought-caused famine in Somalia that year (Danish Red Cross only did it once, in a joint appeal with DCA and SCF-DK).

Why then talk about a drought in Somalia in 1992? I can see two reasons, both questioning the policy of DCA and by implication Danida. The first possible reason for the less than truthful lumping together 16 African countries into one massive drought disaster was the marketing of the national campaign “Brød til Verden” in March 1992 and Danida’s 100 million dkk appropriation on the claim that “[a]pproximately 60 million Africans are estimated to be in immediate danger of starvation.” This is not the place to discuss whether or not there were droughts in the other countries. The problem is to appeal for and donate money to victims of a drought in a country where there was no drought (but people starving for other reasons).

The second reason has to do with the relative compassion-rate of a drought victim and a civil war victim. DCA and Danida stressed drought and down-played civil war in all their appeals and public communications on Somalia because the Somalis had to be “innocent”, a designation used repeatedly in the appeals, in order to attract maximum donations from the public. People destroying their own country provoke too many difficult questions, also about the sustainability of aid.
Yet, it can be argued: If people starved and moneys collected saved them why the fuss? First of all in the self-interest of the aid agencies: it is imperative for them to safe-guard the trust of the public, whether as tax-payers, private donors or governments. Trust is the most crucial asset of agencies doing humanitarian aid. Inaccurate reporting of the dimensions of emergencies and improper identification of the causes of famine in the case of Somalia 1992 may backfire terribly when the claims are proven to be half-truths and exaggerations. Because which claims made by the agencies in the future can the public then trust?

iii) Improvident types of input in Somalia

<p>| Box 8. Summary of agency-responses to Somalia emergencies in 1992 and 1997: |</p>
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Three distinct constraints emerge from the list of inputs above:

i) over-size food aid may feed violent structures causing famine;

ii) emergency aid wants to be development aid;

iii) humanitarian aid is insignificant compared to self-help.

There is a compulsive growth in aid to complex emergencies. The global turnover of the humanitarian aid industry grew from some 500 mill. $ to 15 billion $ in just six years (1992-1998), probably unmatched by any other industry. Even if the global volume may have peaked the volume of aid is now so enormous that when focused on a few emergencies it can be devastating. The weight of aid itself can become a constraint for achieving its objectives. In many ways the phasing out and exiting of aid is a much more difficult problem than building up an operation.

Beyond nutrition food aid is a powerful social resource. In 1992 a top-level report in WFP-Rome estimated that only 15% (fifteen percent) of the delivered food reached the beneficiaries.
This figure was never made public. The rest, 85%, went into the distorted Somali economy, i.e. the war economy of the militias.

The food would be eaten eventually, but it represented first of all an enormous source of looting, feeding the local war-economy. Soup kitchens opened by many NGOs, in particular ICRC, as a way of reducing looting became a very attractive supplementary way of tapping the aid-wealth for powerful Somalis.

One study estimates that 202,000 to 238,000 people died from the famine in 1992. (Maren 1997, p. 214, quoting the Refugee Policy Group, Washington) More people died of hunger in 1992 than in 1991 despite more food being available, probably because civil war denied more people access to food. 100,000 people are estimated to have been saved by the humanitarian assistance, but we do not know if it is ± 1,000, 10,000, or 25,000.

The particular Danish contribution to the 100,000 saved lives can only be guessed. Assuming a (doubtful) linear relation of food distributed and lives saved the specific Danish contribution to ICRC in 1992 could have saved 0.4% or 427 out of the 100,000 people. The total LWF operation could have saved 2777 lives; the LWF accounts does not permit a break-down of the Danish contribution. The floods of 1997 caused around 2,200 deaths. The three-week delay of the relief operation meant that few people were saved from dying as they had already rescued themselves from the direct threat of the water. None of the rehabilitation projects of 1997 were designed to be directly life-saving.

The inputs listed for 1997, except the flood-response, all aimed at medium to long-term rehabilitation: health, education, infrastructure, income-generation etc. Everybody wanted to do the same: build a sustainable society. This reorientation of relief has been dubbed “Programming Relief for Development” and rests on assumptions of a continuum from relief over rehabilitation to development. It is, in my opinion, a problematic notion obfuscating important differences between humanitarian aid and development aid.

Humanitarian aid and development aid are not parts of continuum. They have different targets. Humanitarian aid reach out to individual human beings suddenly torn out of their long-term context. Development aid targets societies, i.e. humans in their long-term context, which ultimately is the state. Of course, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development can and should complement each other, but on the basis of acknowledged difference. In practical terms it means that humanitarian aid should be much more serious about how to phase out relief. The easy part of humanitarian aid is moving in; the difficult part is moving out.
iv) Inadequate control of input in Somalia

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<td>1997/ICRCb</td>
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<td>1997/DCAb</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997/UNHCR</td>
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<td>1997/DRC</td>
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Ultimately the question of control of input in a complex emergency boils down to the question of violence. The key problem which could not be solved was how to protect the vulnerable groups, which all the humanitarian interventors wanted to assist, against powerful, predatory groups. The conclusion to the humanitarian aid to the flood response of 1997-1998 has been succinctly formulated by Mark Bradbury and Vincent Voltan, “If vulnerability and livelihood insecurity are related to access, then the critical issue humanitarian agencies should be addressing is not capacity building or sustainability but protection.” (Bradbury 1998, p. 113)

In the end protection means countering violence with violence. All the arrangements of control devised by the aid agencies had to confront this problem. However, no-one, not even UNITAF nor UNOSOM 1&2, wanted or could go all the way to protect weak groups and rule Somalia against the will of local power-holders. The result was unstable arrangements with elders, militias, local committees, business people and whatever could pass as a local authority.

After the unsolved problems of protection of a massive humanitarian intervention in 1992 (and even more acute in 1993) the tendency in 1997 seemed to be not to deliver more inputs than local power-holders could protect. Valuable inputs could only realistically be protected by local business-men/faction leaders with their own security forces. Only inputs with local protection, like the example mentioned below of the Mogadishu water-supply protected by an armed business-group, had any hope of sustainability. Even this was on the balance, and the immediate
beneficiaries would be the business-people, not any vulnerable IDP, woman or child unable to pay for water.

D. Constraints of peace-inducing impact

In the concluding section I try to answer the very simple and very difficult question: did the help help? I address the question from one angle only: the “peace-inducing impact” because I take peace to be the precondition for successful humanitarian aid and rehabilitation. Thus the question is: Did the humanitarian aid projects contribute to the termination of civil war, i.e. termination of internal attacks claiming more than 1000 casualties per year?

Somalia was suffering civil war in 1992; in 1997 there was armed violence, but no war in Somaliland and Puntland. The number of casualties had also dropped significantly from 1992 to 1997 in the south, but probably not below 1000, i.e. the civil war had not ended in the south.

Was this change from 1992 to 1997 caused by the humanitarian input or did it happen in spite of the external input or did it perhaps occur unrelated to this? To answer this question in any definitive way, if possible at all, would demand a full exploration of Somali history, a task falling very much outside the scope of this report. I can only offer a circumstantial argument.

The humanitarian projects were not directly intended to be peace-inducing. They were designed to save lives or begin rehabilitation (generate development). However, in the complex Somali emergency there were neither protection nor legitimate rule. State power was fragmented. Therefore, to implement projects some kind of protection and some kind of legitimate rule had to be created. A state-building perspective was added, evolving from UNOSOM interventionism, over total disillusion to the present experimental caretaker state. The question of peace-inducing impact may thus be restated more accurately: Did the efforts to save lives and begin rehabilitation contribute to the Somali state being focused or fragmented?

i) Saving lives

The inputs to save lives, predominantly food, were injected into the most dispersed units of power and violence: the house spaces. Little or no protection was possible from within these units and the enormous resources floated upwards looted by larger violent units, typically the militias.

“Pouring more food into this unnatural and corrupted economic system would do more harm than good without a dramatic change in the security situation... Perhaps the two objectives of
decreasing violence and increasing nutrition were mutually exclusive in the absence of a disciplined security force.” concluded Andrew Natsios, a top USAID man in Somalia 1992.

Following the argument of Bradbury and Voltan, quoted above, that it was lack of protection rather than lack of food due to natural causes that created the famine of 1992, it can be concluded that the humanitarian aid was unable to attend to the most pressing need of vulnerable groups. The riverine Bantu farmers in particular could not defend their houses against militias looting or demanding forced labour. Helping people in feeding centres and refugee camps saved lives but not houses, not the livelihood of the starving people. Indeed the Hawie occupation of Bay and Bacool to a large degree responsible for the continued violence was not addressed by the humanitarian aid nor the military intervention.

**ii) Generating development**

I argue that there is little evidence to support the idea that development secures peace. Development may be a good thing in its own right, but it should not be confused with action for peace.

Denmark’s engagement in Somalia’s development dates from 1980. During 17 years Denmark assisted the people of Somalia with more than half a billion Kroner. 63% of the 532 million dkk was donated as development aid and 37% as humanitarian aid. The Danish development aid was only a tiny part of the enormous input of aid to Somalia in its period as an ally of the West during the 1980s. The aid bankrolled the gross corruption of Siad Barre’s regime and was partly responsible for the resentment provoking the civil war. None of the Danish development projects in Somalia survived the civil war.

There appears to be no unequivocal correlation between absolute human development level and war. While it is true that more poor countries are at war than rich countries, most poor countries are not at war while a number of rich countries are at war including some of the world’s richest countries involved in wars outside their own territory. It is a general phenomena that a war-torn country is poorer when the war ends than when it began. To the extent there exists any significant relation between wealth/poverty and peace/war it seems to be the opposite of the “economic development = peace” proposition: war is more likely to break out when a country is rich and end when the country is exhausted and poor.

After six years of conflict the Human Development Index of Somalia had dropped dramatically from an index of 0.221 in 1989-90 to an estimated index of 0.184-0.159 in 1995-97, that is to the absolute bottom of the world. Yet, the eruption of a heavy weapons civil war equal to the one ravaging the country from 1988-92 is highly unlikely today. A drop in development has lead to
an increase in peace. My conclusion is not, let me repeat, that development (projects) inevitably causes war, but that neither the opposite statement is true: that development as such causes peace.

iii) Conclusion: focusing the Somali state
The problem of the peace-inducing impact of humanitarian aid can be narrowed down to the question: Did the efforts to save lives and begin rehabilitation contribute to the Somali state being focused or fragmented? A fragmentation would favour civil war, while focusing would favour a termination of civil war. When I talk about ‘focusing’ the Somali state, the first question is: which Somali state? and the second is: what can drive it into focus?

Mohamed Saeed Mohamed ‘Geez’, Minister of Planning in the Somaliland government said to me in Hargeisa,
“We Somalis are tribal. We have to live with it without letting it destroy us. Up to now no system was devised that could deal with the tribes. They must share something - a state. Somaliland is not a tribal entity like Puntland. It has historical colonial borders. We are an experiment for all Somalia. If we cannot do it - then God bless Somalia!”

Four alternatives for focusing the Somali state
During the last ten years four alternatives in dealing with the fragmented Somali state from the outside has been attempted.

1) Protectorate or trustee-ship under military administration; suspension of national sovereignty for a prolonged period. This is an update of British Military Administration.
2) Outside sponsored top-down state building of the Siad Barre model. The nation state recreated on the basis of a national army sponsored by outside power(s).
3) Local bottom-up state building with minimal outside involvement. Small-scale infrastructure and services.
4) State of an experimental type. A minimal, federal state with radical freedom for local entrepreneurs, internationalized social service and unresolved problems of violence

UNOSOM never amounted to a protectorate because there was no hegemonial power desiring (the US) or able (the UN) to implement this alternative. Whatever the much discussed reasons for the failure of UNOSOM, it is safe to say that no-one is going to propose a protectorate in Somalia in the foreseeable future.

The alternative of a top-down state, based on a national army, demands an (unlikely) regional agreement, or war. The permanent geo-political conflict of Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile
waters seems to keep Somalia constantly destabilized. There is no unity of purpose amongst Somalia's neighbours to recreate a unified state, and no other external pressure (comparable to the cold-war geo-politics) to do so. The present war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has increased even more the value for Ethiopia of a separate Somaliland (and Puntland) with access to the harbours of Berbera and Bosaso, thus further dimming the hopes of peace in Somalia.

Ever since the departure of Barre the outside world has tried unsuccessfully to produce new national leaders of Somalia. Civil society persons, women, professionals, business-men, elders, traditional leaders etc. have all been supported without even remotely challenging the power of the men with guns. In the foreseeable future it is unlikely that a national leader can focus the power of Somalia. In the event of continued turmoil in Somalia donor states outside the region may reduce their involvement to the absolute minimum. This will be the global city shutting out the global countryside with its “failed” states by restricted refugee reception in donor countries and other means of international containment.

At the moment many functions of a Somali state are taken care of by international agencies in Nairobi. The Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body tries to co-ordinate the work and in many ways perform the tasks of a government. But there are at least two crucial differences from a nation state. The Somali state has not disappeared, it has fragmented. Thus the Nairobi caretaker state is an addition to the multiple state-fragments in Somalia. There is a very clear division of labour. SACB provide state service: health, education, infrastructure etc. while the state-fragments provide violent rule. Violence is out of the hands of SACB. The second difference partly follows from this. SACB has no democratic mandate from the Somali population.

However, the caretaker state is an experiment with a new form of state. How far the practice of the administration in Nairobi will take it is impossible to tell. We do not know how it will be developed by the Somalis themselves. Yet, it is without doubt the only initiative suggesting a peaceful way out of the impasse of ethnic space.

Conclusions

The result is not impressive. Humanitarian aid alone is not able to induce peace. It will have to be linked with efforts to focus the violence of the state. The DBG project in the chaotic south Somalia situation should be noted. Alone among the reviewed projects the well trained and highly motivated local DBG staff was able to give their inputs acceptable local protection. This is important in order to make the experimental internationalized state work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peace induced</th>
<th>Lives saved</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>State built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1992</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC, famine</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, many</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Protectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA, famine</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Protectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1997</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC, rehab.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, few</td>
<td>Lottery</td>
<td>Caretaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC, floods</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, few</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Caretaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBG, rehab.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lottery</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA, floods</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, few</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Caretaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR, repat.</td>
<td>- *</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC, rehab.</td>
<td>- *</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lottery</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* no war in Somaliland in 1997

It may be objected that when DBG co-operated with local state structures that excluded women or business-men that denied poor people access to services DBG induced peace at the unacceptable price of marginalizing the very groups Danida tries to help. However, the sample presents no better alternatives. The UNHCR and DRC projects in Somaliland also had local protection, but unlike in the south where the state was completely fragmented, in the north they could rely on some protection by a fledgling, fragile bottom-up state, and thus the situation demanded less inventiveness on the part of the humanitarian aid agencies than in the south.

Lives can be saved in complex emergencies by timely humanitarian assistance. However, this assistance will quickly feed the destructive structures aggravating complex emergencies. It is imperative not to sustain the humanitarian assistance beyond the immediate emergency. Agencies should make it a priority to find ways to terminate aid; in particular avoid yielding to pressures by conflict constituencies to perpetuate aid.

To be a beneficiary of the services provided by rehabilitation/development projects was fully comparable to winning in a lottery. The winners were happy, but they were very few. The local structures of violence giving or denying individual Somalis access to the lottery were almost impossible to touch for the donors. Inputs given to vulnerable groups provoked looting; only small-scale inputs given to privileged groups with arms did not initiate new violence. The result was extremely low sustainability of the services and grossly inequitable access to them.
The paradox of present Somalia is the inner strength of clan society focusing almost all violence and power, and the external pressure to preserve the state space of Somalia. Peace in Somalia has to begin in ethnic space.
II. Introduction

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of the project is to assess which forms of aid in complex emergencies are most effective, defined as their “peace-inducing” capacity (I explain this term below). The aim of the project is thus not to produce an evaluation report but rather to identify some key policy dilemmas. In pursuing this objective the project will map the constraints to Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia in 1992 and 1997.

2.2 Empirical input

Empirical input for the present project will be a selection of Danish humanitarian aid projects to Somalia, Afghanistan and Bosnia in 1992 and 1997. It is planned to concentrate on 3 projects from each country in each year; a total of 18 projects/donations. Desk studies and interviews will be conducted in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in selected NGO/UN agencies, and with the beneficiaries (intended or otherwise) in the three recipient countries.

The ambition is to follow a number of individual projects from initial appeals to impact on the ground in Somalia and eventually in Afghanistan and Bosnia. As donations in most cases were pooled with donations from other countries it has not always been possible or reasonable to specify implementations of Danish donations alone. The focus on Danish humanitarian aid may be questioned on two opposite counts. It is too specific Danish to reveal general problems; in the field Danish aid cannot be singled out in multinational operations. However, I assume that a number of problems and dilemmas found in Danish aid are common problems found in most aid projects; thus a discussion of Danish aid may well be of general relevance. Secondly, the expected difficulty in tracing a specific one-on-one impact of particular aid projects in the field is in itself an important feature that should be discussed.

Quite apart from the subjective limitations of the present writer in terms of knowledge, time and other resources, a number of objective problems limited how far the above-mentioned ambition could be fulfilled. In their evaluation of the Somalia flood-response in 1997 Mark Bradbury and Vincent Coultan mentioned five limitations for their work1 all of which were also encountered during my own work: problems of access due to lack of security; people involved in the projects have since left; time and opportunity to visit beneficiaries in rural areas was limited; quantifying

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impact proved very difficult; and finally assessing the legitimacy of local authorities was not feasible.

I was able to visit Hargeisa and Mogadishu, but not Kismayo for security reasons as heavy fighting broke out in Juba at the time of my visit in early December 1998. Because I went down with malaria I missed the opportunity to visit Puntland. I did one field-trip to nomads living to the south of Hargeisa and two field-trips out of Mogadishu, one to small villages in the Qorioley district in Lower Shebelle and one to small villages in the Jowhar district in Middle Shebelle; still my direct contact with the intended beneficiaries was severely limited.

I was accompanied on my visit to Somaliland by the chairman of “Det Somaliske Folk i Danmark” Mr. Rage Haji Mohamad Rage which greatly facilitated my contact with various Somaliland officials, business people, intellectuals, and others, as well as provided a valuable Somali perspective on our experiences.

2.3 Somalia, Afghanistan and Bosnia

The present report is based on the trip to Somalia; material from Afghanistan and Bosnia is yet to come. Obviously comparative conclusions are premature at this stage; therefor this paper concentrates on section 4: the actual material gathered on Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia and section 5: impact on Somalia. Section 2 is very brief pending a discussion of the relevant results of Danida’s evaluation of Humanitarian Aid; a general discussion including the current theoretical literature is postponed entirely until material from Afghanistan and Bosnia can provide a comparative perspective.

Somalia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia were the largest beneficiaries of Danish humanitarian aid in Africa, Asia and Europe respectively in 1992/1997. In Afghanistan the humanitarian aid was not protected by a military UN-operation. In Somalia protection of humanitarian aid was the direct justification for the first peace-building Chapter VII operation; Denmark did not participate with troops. In Bosnia Denmark participated (and participates) in the UN peace-keeping, later peace-building and finally Nato’s rehabilitating military operation. Thus the research will encompass some of Denmark’s key beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, and the three countries will furthermore provide a sample enabling a comparison of different combinations of military and civilian humanitarian interventions.

Complex emergencies develop in a global setting, linked by a host of actors producing and responding to large political shifts, such as the end of the Cold War. By prioritizing assistance the decisions of aid agencies directly link emergencies otherwise separate. Preferably
comparison of cases should be made synchronically; 1992 and 1997 were selected as reference-points for a comparison of Danish humanitarian aid. Five years is a long time in the aid-business. I encountered no-one, whether in NGOs, state institutions or UN-agencies that had remained in the same post since 1992. Some had moved to related posts, but personal recollections of aid in 1992 to Somalia was no longer present with people dealing with aid to Somalia in 1997.

2.4 “Peace-inducing”.

War is a special case of violence; a society may be very violent and yet not ravaged by (civil) war. Most analysts define war, including civil war, in terms of intensity as a violent event causing a thousand or more battle-deaths. However, the line separating war from violence in general is extremely blurred. Both crime and state rule over subject groups may escalate into violence of war intensity.²

When I speak of peace-inducing it is thus first understood narrowly as an input believed to contribute to the reduction of the number of battle-deaths in a certain conflict to below a thousand (per year). At this stage data are collected. But what indicators can and should be employed? What are the relevant time and space frames? Altogether different conclusions to the aid story may be reached by selecting different time-space indicators for example measuring change over months instead of years, at local level instead of national level and so on. In most cases a frame can be crafted to substantiate a pre-concieved, politically convenient conclusion.

Secondly, peace-inducing implies a causal relation between input and change. But is the relation between aid and violence positive, negatige or zero? What would have happend had inputs been ommitted, increased, or changed? The answer involves a highly contentious interpretation of the impact of aid that only gets more intractable when the interpretation of impact is extended from physical dimensions (hunger, disease, death, displacement) to socio-political relations (e.g. ‘local capacities for peace’, institutional development or democratic sustainability).

To assess the impact of humanitarian aid, then, instead of measuring a problematic causal relation it may be possible to trace structural relations spatially. Borrowing from the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari their metaphorical terminology of “tree and rhizome” a complex emergency may be interpreted as having a rhizomatic structure.³ To analyse it we should look for structural diffusion rather than causal process, for difference rather than

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² I discuss in detail the problems of quantitative indicators of war and peace in Tin 1998.
development. This methodology can generate several flat structural mappings of synchronous situations (in this case Somalia in 1992 and 1997, presented in a very sketchy fashion in section 5). The result will highlight difference, not development, a difference which ultimately may be addressed according to political objectives; for example “a democratic Somalia” and hence a decision to give aid or not to give aid.
III. Constraints of donations:
Department of Humanitarian Aid, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From a global point of view the needs of poor people caught up in emergencies are virtually unlimited. There certainly seems to be no end in sight of new emergencies descending upon unfortunate populations, and when do old ones end? Somalia is a point in case. Confronted with this view of an overwhelming need the first practical constraint of humanitarian aid will appear to be the financial capacity of the donors: “Denmark cannot help everyone in need”. Financial capacity, however, does not have a fixed ceiling and the size and distribution of donations will reflect financial muscle, political priorities, and institutional desires.

In Denmark there was throughout the five-year period reviewed a broad political consensus for sustaining a very high level of aid when compared with most other donor-countries. Development aid was by law to be kept at 1 per cent of GNP (12.5 billion ddk in 1998) and added to this was a separate fund for humanitarian assistance not under the law for development aid (but under the same minister) called the “Environment, Peace and Stability Assistance Fund” in 1999 by law amounting to 0.25% of GNP (3.3 billion ddk in 1999) and set to raise to 0.5% of GNP in the year 2005.

However, the neat, rounded-off percentages indicate that considerations of an institutional nature completely alien to the particular needs of particular people in particular emergencies dictate the working-out of the politics of aid. There is rarely a need out there in the world nicely fullfillable with exactly X mill. Danish Kroner or even with 1% of Denmark’s GNP. Financial constraints, political realities and institutional routines prefigure the needs, that is the donors carve out a handy need fitting the financial capacities, political opportunities and institutional drives of the day.

The money spent on humanitarian aid to a certain population at risk is the first limit of Denmark’s commitment, i.e. the first major constraint of the impact of humanitarian aid. Confronted with the endless global need Denmark choose to allocate the following funds to humanitarian assistance to Somalia.
Box 1. Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia in 1992 and 1997

1991-1997
In the period 1991-97 more than 100 donations were granted to Somalia by the Humanitarian Aid Department of the Foreign Ministry, amounting to 198.313 mill. dkk. Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia was given for the first time in 1991 (1.5 mill. dkk to Dan Church Aid). The 1988-91 civil war in the north of Somalia with massive destruction, atrocities and displacement passed without any Danish humanitarian assistance (but with continued Danish development aid, see box 11).

1992
Global Danish humanitarian assistance in 1992 amounted to 804,325 mill. dkk. This included assistance to Somalia of 104,915 mill. dkk; the largest appropriation to a single country in 1992. The donations were received/implemented by the following nine organisations: UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UN Somalia Trust Fund, ICRC, IFRC, Danish Red Cross, Dan Church Aid, and Save the Children Denmark.

1997
By 1997 Danish humanitarian assistance to Somalia had fallen to 20.4 mill. dkk while the total Danish humanitarian assistance had grown to 843.5 mill. dkk (after peaking in 1996 with more than one billion dkk). The donations were received/implemented by eight organisations, six active since 1992: UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC, Danish Red Cross, Dan Church Aid, and two newcomers: ADRA Denmark, and Danish Refugee Council.

Looking through all the files on Danish aid to Somalia in the archives of the Foreign Ministry I found no documentation of the criteria for decisions to fund individual projects. There were no memos, no discussion papers, no minutes of discussions of why some appeals were approved while others were refused.

Two obvious explanations may be suggested: too much money for a minuscule staff, and too little money for endless needs. A stressed staff had to react to horrifying human suffering often under severe time pressure. In 1992 only three full-time staff were employed in the desk of Humanitarian Assistance, by 1997 the number had grown to six. These few people had to distribute an annual allocation of close to one billion dkk. As a comparison it can be noted that 120 ECHO full-time staff in 1997 distributed Ecu 442 mill (3.094 mill. dkk), or 25.8 mill. dkk each, that is ten times less than their colleagues in Copenhagen. For the small staff in
Copenhagen it was simply a lot of money to keep tabs on and there was perhaps little immediate need to prepare written reflections or guidelines on the fast changing and expanding practice of how to do humanitarian aid. And no time was left to do it once the money had been spent and a new emergency demanded full attention.

Secondly, and much more problematic, even this large sum of money available for humanitarian assistance was a limited resource. How to make the best use of them given the mindbogling variety and complexity of all the world’s emergencies? It was only possible as one senior officer pointed out to me on the basis of trust between the ministry and the humanitarian agencies. The staff, rotating from post to post, seldom had time to acquire any specialist knowledge of the countries of the various emergencies they have to select or reject for donations. There was simply no time or staff at hand for a critical evaluation of requests for emergency aid or to exercise the control necessary to avoid incidents like agencies distributing dental floss and contact-lens solution as emergency relief, both of which inadvertently were funded by Danida (DR-news 2-2-99).

Within this framework the Ministry had to rely almost totally on appeals coming to them; they could only in a very limited way initiate relief. Ideally it was up to the appealing/implementing agencies to monitor the world’s disasters and secure that the appeals addressed the most urgent needs in a proper way. When the funds had been used it was the duty of the agencies to report on the impact of their projects so that they and the Ministry could improve the humanitarian assistance next time.

However, the reality as it could be ascertained from the files was far from this ideal. A consequence of the understaffing was that all reporting was done by the implementing agencies, and not by the ministry contributing the funds. The reporting was generally slow if forthcoming at all and the quality extremely low, in most cases limited to a simple financial account. It is noteworthy to what extent appeals were tailored to the budgetary routine of the Ministry that stipulated that donations up to 2 mill. could be granted administratively, those up to 8 mill. by the minister, while only those above 8 mill. needed parliamentary approval. Most appeals just touched the 2 mill. dkk limit. Another indication of the staff constraint was the difficulty for the Ministry to revise the proposed budgets in any substantial manner. Budgets received from the agencies in the field were normally granted fully or, more often in 1997 than in 1992, cut with what seemed an arbitrary amount, i.e. from 3 mill. to 2 mill. without reference to details in the budgets. The reality of staff constraints favoured fewer and larger donations, and in particular on-going programmes with predictable emergencies, such as Sudan and had by 1997 led to multi-year, block appropriations to the largest NGOs, thus potentially further weakening the Ministry’s control.
Box 2. Six Danish humanitarian aid donations to Somalia, 1992 & 1997

1/1992 Danish Red Cross donations to Somalia for 5 mill. dkk; ICRC and IFRC programmes in Somalia for 11 mill. dkk. Total funding of Danish Red Cross was 107.198 mill. dkk (excluding expenses of 16 mill. dkk for delegates of whom 12 were in Somalia). The total donation to ICRC and IFRC was 46 mill. dkk in 1992.

2/1992 Dan Church Aid donations to Somalia for 20 mill. dkk. Total funding of Dan Church Aid in 1992 was 101.402 mill. dkk.

3/1997 Danish Red Cross donations to Somalia for 5 mill. dkk. Total funding of Danish Red Cross in 1997 was 41.32 mill. dkk. while ICRC and IFRC received a total of 59.5 mill. dkk.

4/1997 Denmark funded UNHCR programmes in Somalia for 5 mill. dkk. Total Danish contribution to UNHCR in 1997 was 267 mill. dkk.

5/1997 Dan Church Aid donations to Somalia for 1.5 mill. dkk. Total funding of Dan Church Aid in 1997 was 66,080 mill. dkk.

6/1997 Danish Refugee Council programme in Somalia for 4 mill. dkk. Total donations to Danish Refugee Council in 1997 was 41,107 mill. dkk.

Criteria for the selection of donations for the present study were simple: The Red Cross Movement had to be included due to its deep involvement with the Somalia emergency and as one of the largest agencies in humanitarian aid both internationally and in Denmark. A UN agency had to be included for the same reasons; UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP were the UN agencies with Somalia programmes funded by Denmark, UNHCR was chosen because of broad involvement also in the regional politics. Finally, the third agency should be a Danish NGO; by far the largest and most important in the field of humanitarian aid was Dan Church Aid. However, they were not themselves implementing projects in Somalia, so it was natural also to include one Danish NGO implementing projects in Somalia; beyond the Danish subsidiaries of ADRA and SCF only one was left: Danish Refugee Council. The selected projects represent 43
% of the total official humanitarian aid given to Somalia in 1992 and 76% of the total official humanitarian aid given to Somalia in 1997.

### Box 3. Calendar for Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia 1992 & 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Feb</td>
<td>DRK 7 mill. ‘civil war’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March</td>
<td>FKN 8 mill. ‘drought’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 March</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘conflict’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘refugees in Kenya’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘drought’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug.</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘drought’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sep.</td>
<td>DRK 5 mill. ‘drought’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep.</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘drought’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov.</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘drought &amp; conflict’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov.</td>
<td>DRK 5 mill. ‘ICRC-aid’</td>
<td>transferred to 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January</td>
<td>DRK 3 mill. ‘on-going’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 August</td>
<td>DFH 4 mill. ‘repatriation’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>UNHCR 5 mill. ‘refugees’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September</td>
<td>FKN 2 mill. ‘c.w. &amp; drought’</td>
<td>referred to 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Johs. Dahl-Hansen, in charge of the office of humanitarian aid in 1992, provided some insight in the criteria used by the Ministry for granting humanitarian aid. He had responded in a creative way to the rapidly unfolding emergency in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa in 1992. Already in September 1991 the UN Consolidated Appeal from the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa estimated “4.5 million to be at serious risk after three years of conflict in Somalia”. Information from FAO, WHO and DHA indicated that a major emergency was building up. A few small donations would not do the job, but on the other hand administratively appropriating a string of donations could cause problems later on in the parliamentary committee for finance. In March 1992 Johs. Dahl-Hansen took the unusual initiative in dealing with the escalating crisis in Eastern and Southern Africa to suggest Denmark should contribute with a sum of 100 mill. dkk.

“The 100 millions were a guess, a nice round sum. [De 100 milliner var et skud, et paent rundt beløb.]” he said with a smile in 1999. A key justification for the unprecedented appropriation of 100 mill. dkk (October 1992 expanded to 120 mill. dkk) to African emergencies was the linking of civil wars in East Africa with drought in Southern Africa. Dahl-Hansen explained that this link warranted an extraordinary commitment with food aid. Essential in getting political support to the proposal was the argument that most of the money anyway would go to Danish farmers selling their surplus produce to WFP. Before voting on the act Johs. Dahl-Hansen sent his deputy Kristian Højersholt to the WFP HQ in Rome in order to ascertain that Danish agricultural produce would be part of the food-aid to Africa and that a satisfactory amount of money would go to Danish farmers.

Danida argued that the cause of the emergency was a pan African drought; in a press statement released on 26 March they claimed “[A drought] estimated to be the worst in fifty years to hit Eastern and Southern Africa... now threatens more than 20 million people with a catastrophic famine.” Danida not only accepted all claims in the DCA appeal of 18 March, but on their own account raised the figure of people in need from 18 to more than 20 millions and announced a
pledge of 8 mill. dkk to help the “the drought victims of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Somalia” by chartering a ship to bring food from Scandinavia to Africa.

But perhaps even 20 million starving people were not enough. Two weeks later, in the official appeal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance the dimensions of the emergency suddenly was enlarged dramatically 300%, “Approximately 60 million Africans are estimated to be in immediate danger of starvation in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.” This series of escalating and linked claims of drought made it possible to vote in the Danish Parliament an unprecedented 100 mill. dkk blanket emergency aid donation to drought victims in Africa on 21 April.

When the act was voted on in the parliamentary committee of finance in April 1992 it was supported by all parties, even the right-wing parties habitually against all Danish development aid. In a related debate in the parliament a liberal politician Ms. Mimmi Jacobsen swung the house in favour of supporting suffering Africans by relating how on a holiday in Zimbabwe she herself had seen animals dying of thirst in a national park.

On 12 May 1992 Denmark contributed to WFP a special emergency allocation of $13,516,478 $. In confirmation with normal practice produce was bought through the Danish Ministry of Agriculture from Danish farmers eager to sell off their surplus production. 10.000 tons of wheat was sent to Somalia at a price of 1,400,000 $ plus 1,500,000 $ in transport costs and 116,000$ administration charge to WFP for just this one consignment. Everywhere in the system big numbers were better than small numbers, even if they had precious little bearing on the realities of suffering. Steven Green, current head of the WFP evaluation department and personally responsible in 1992 for the WFP estimates of the food-deficit in Eastern and Southern Africa considered Danida’s 60 million figure “wild; absolutely wrong” (personal communication, Copenhagen 25 March 1999).

The rest of the year Dahl-Hansen could administratively grant money to individual projects within the 100 mill. dkk frame - also to Somalia donations not justified by drought. For example when the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 4 June granted funds to Danish Red Cross operations in Somalia there was not a single word on drought but on “victims of conflict” in his comments to Parliament. Drought or no drought, needs soon outstripped all allocations and on 30 October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appealed to Parliament to enlarge the fund for drought-victims in Africa from 100 to 120 mill. dkk. Not only was the drought once again claimed to threatened 60 million people, but it was now no longer the worst drought this century but “the worst drought in the last 100 years.” The money was appropriated. Johs. Dahl-Hansen conceded that
many appeals were built on very flimsy arguments; they were not necessarily wrong but he knew that his office did not have the capacity to evaluate the assessments of need nor what impact the donations had. Indeed, he pointed out, this was not a particular Danish problem; on annual Nordic meetings of heads of humanitarian sections it was a general matter of concern how little knowledge they had of the countries they supported and the impact of their help. In a wish to improve the performance of humanitarian aid Dahl-Hansen as one of his last initiatives before becoming Danish ambassador to Brazil initiated the famous Rwanda-evaluation process.
IV. Constraints of delivery

This section tries to identify constraints for the performance of ICRC, UNHCR, and NGOs in Somalia 1992 and 1997. In this section the perspective is that of the implementing agency. The question of impact will be addressed in section 5. Included in this section are interviews with relevant people and descriptions of the projects where it was possible to trace them on the ground. The chronological presentations are based on documents found in Ministry and NGO files in Denmark, Somalia and Kenya, and on interviews and first-hand observations. Constraints are discussed along four parameters:

i) accurate identification in the appeals of the dimensions of need?
ii) proper identification in the appeals of the causes of the emergency?
iii) implementation of adequate types of input in Somalia?
iv) sufficient control of input in Somalia?

Somalia 1992

Sidiad Barre, the ruler of Somalia since 1969 was ousted in 1991; three years of terrible civil war in the north ended with the internationally unrecognised declaration of independence of Somaliland inside the border of former British Somaliland on May 18, 1991. November 1991-March 1992 Mogadishu was largely destroyed by heavy fighting between two Hawiye subclans: Habar Gidir/Mohammad Farah Aideed faction and Abgal/Ali Mahdi faction, dividing the city in a southern part under Aideed and a northern part under Mahdi. While the north of Somalia remained relatively calm during 1992 civil war spread to most of southern Somalia, especially around Kismayo. Bay and Bakool were effectively occupied by Aideed forces causing widespread famine. 8 December US Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) landed, eventually building up a force of 30,000 troops in southern Somalia.

The famine of 1991-92 was not caused by an entirely new situation, but aggravation of a long-term problem. In 1970-74 Somalia had a food surplus of 5%; this changed to a deficit of 30% in 1980-84. Ever since Somalia had been heavily dependent on food imports. The decline in food self-sufficiency was a permanent feature of independent Somalia, and it occurred despite massive international investments in the rural sector. The UNDP Human Development Report for Somalia listed six causes for the food-deficit: rapid population growth; rapid urbanisation;

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changes in food consumption habits; inappropriate government price controls; impact of large scale food-aid; and cash cropping of bananas for export on the most fertile land.

ICRC claimed to be the only organisation working in the whole of Somalia after the evacuation in December 1990-January 1991 of all international UN and NGO personnel from Mogadishu. Basis for the claim was the co-operation with Somali Red Crescent present in five branches throughout the country (Kismayo, Baidoa, Mogadishu, Garowe, Hargeisa). Skeleton relief operation had continued through 1991 in the north by CARE, SCF and ICRC; UNICEF and UNHCR returned to Somaliland in a very small way towards the end of 1991.
4.1 1992 ICRC-IFRC-Danish Red Cross

i) Dimensions of emergency

The number of Somalis in need of emergency food assistance in 1992 was variously estimated by ICRC/DRC to be: 4.5 million, 3.5 million, 1.5 million, and more than 1 million.

- 12 February, appeal

Danish Red Cross requested 7 mill. dkk for emergency aid to Somalia. Quoting FAO a food-deficit of 500,000 tonnes for 1992 was expected; the total population of Somalia was estimated to be 3-4 million.

- 14 February, press release

Pressure was put behind the national appeals by a ICRC Press release from Nairobi: “ICRC director of operations, who returned yesterday from Mogadishu, warns of a human catastrophe in Somalia unless a major relief operation is launched in the coming weeks... The ICRC estimates that around 4.5 mill people in Somalia are in need of food assistance.”

- 21 April, Inter-Agency Plan

ICRC together with the UN launched the “Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.” It is estimated that “the lives of 1.5 million people are seriously threatened by lack of access to food and health care provision” while a further 3.5 million Somalis were in “urgent need of humanitarian assistance.”

- June 24, press release

“It is estimated that over one million Somalis are in need of emergency food assistance. “

- 9 July, Plan of Action

ICRC published their “Emergency Plan of Action, Somalia” in Geneva, complementing the appeal being launched by the UN, and finalized after joint planning with the WFP. ICRC now estimated that the number of Somalis “directly affected by the conflict and in dire need of immediate assistance throughout the whole country is over 1.5 million.”

- 17 September, appeal

Danish Red Cross’ assessment of needs in Somalia in their appeal was remarkably short, “The situationen in Somalia is well-known and deserve no further elaboration.”
ii) Causes of emergency

In all their appeals did the ICRC/Danish Red Cross put civil war/clan conflict as the cause of deaths, famine, disease and displacement; only in one appeal issued in Denmark jointly with Dan Church Aid and SCF-DK was drought presented as the cause of the emergency.

- 14 February, press release
  “Inter-clan fighting and tension have caused a detoriating nutritional situation.”

- 9 July, Plan of Action
In the 12 page “Emergency Plan of Action, Somalia” the devastating effects of the armed conflict is detailed for each region of the country. Drought is not mentioned with a single word.

- 21 September, appeal
In a joint appeal with Dan Church Aid and SCF-DK drought in Africa in general is given as cause for need. No attempt is made to substantiate the claim of drought in Somalia.

iii) Types of input

Input was overwhelmingly dominated by food. From January to December a total of 140,000 tonnes was distributed. From May communal kitchens serving cooked food became important, in December the number reached more than 770. The input of ICRC and WFP combined was estimated to feed 3 million people.

- 10 January, press release
  “First ships unloaded in Merca and Adale 1,700 mt of relief supplies for war wounded and displaced from Mogadishu.” ICRC, Somali Red Crescent and NorCross provided dispensaries.

- 14 February, press release
  “The ICRC is flying in medical supplies daily and has already provided over 3,000 tonnes of food for the civilian population... Distribution began in Kismayo after an ICRC-chartered ship arrived there on 10 February.”

- 11 March, press release
  “ICRC expanded its operations and opened an office in Belet Huen for airlifts of 70 tonnes of food per day; crossborder truck relief from Kenya, and crossline supplies in Mogadishu.”

- 6 May, press release
  “10,000 mt of food was unloaded at the beaches of Gezira, Merca and Keysanay.”

- June 24, press release
  “Hundreds of kitchens are now open across southern Somalia providing food daily for over 300,000 people, 90 percent of whom are woman and children. The ICRC has brought more than 52,000 mt of relief food through 20 entry points into Somalia since the beginning of 1992.”

- 17 August, press release
  “ICRC started a ship to shore helicopter operation along the northern Somali coast because monsoon rains made landing on the beaches impossible.”

- 18 August, press release
“Somalia was ICRC’s largest relief operation. 83.000 mt of food had so far been distributed, and 70.000 mt were foreseen for the next five months. The operation was costing more than 150 million US$, which was one third of ICRC’s total budget for 1992.”
- 1 September, press release
“A massive airlift of relief supplies had begun using aircraft provided by the government of the United States [and some Belgian and French planes]. The airlift was carried out according to the ICRC’s usual methods of operation: red cross markings on the planes, special red cross call signs for each aircraft, notifications to all parties and no arms on board. Nearly 600 communal kitchens throughout Somalia provided cooked meals for over one million starving people.”
- 8 October, press release
“80 expatriates, including 40 seconded by the National Societies and 1500 volunteers from Somali Red Crescent Society were working in Somalia. 112.000 tonnes of rice, lentils, and oil had been shipped in since January to 1,5 million beneficiaries: 88,000 tonnes by ship; 12.000 tonnes by plane and 12.000 tonnes by road (the WFP had provided 50.000 tonnes since May 1992).”
- 12 October, press release
“Jean de Courten, Director of Operations of the ICRC stated at the co-ordination-meeting of humanitarian assistance to Somalia in Geneva 12-13 October that the ICRC had now distributed 120.000 tonnes of food, 850 tonnes of seeds and agricultural implements; opened 770 kitchens; 10 hospitals received assistance performing 250 operations per week. 40 first-aid centres regularly recieved medical supplies from the ICRC; the ICRC had opened 50 dispensaries and ICRC veterinarians have vaccinated 2,5 million sheep and goats, and 500.000 camels and as many cattle. 20.000 Red Cross messages were exchanged each month. They had spent 250 million chf; the Somali operation was ICRC’s largest since the Second World War.”
- 22 October, press release
“320 kitchens in Mogadishu South and North were feeding nearly 450.000 people. The ICRC paid the cost of firewood, water, salt, sugar and vegetables which amount to 200.000 Somali shillings a day.”
- 5 November, press release
“ICRC started airlifts to the famine-stricken Somali town Bardera. 200 people died of malnutrition every day, in a press release it was called a second Baidoa. 15 tonnes of food was airlifted on 5/11; three truckloads arrived 31/10. The combined efforts of ICRC and WFP were able to feed an estimated 3 million people.”
- 14 December, press release
Five days after the landing of the UNITAF-force in Mogadishu ICRC stated it would maintain its presence in Somalia. “The ICRC will carry on its humanitarian work as before, albeit at a reduced rate of implementation. The port of Mogadishu is yet open for ICRC vessels at the moment. So far this year the ICRC has brought in 140.000 tonnes of food.”
iv) Control of input

ICRC tried to protect their input by negotiating and co-operating with local structures of power and violence (local elders and militias); by decreasing the vulnerability of the input (wet-feeding), and finally by (grudgingly?) accepting military intervention.

- 14 February, press release
  “Local committees composed of clan elders have been organised to ensure an equitable distribution of the supplies.”

- 6 May, press release
  “120 cooking places for wet feeding had been set up in an attempt to prevent looting of dry rations”

- 8 May, press release
  A press release from Nairobi explained the security set-up for food aid in Mogadishu and for the first time directly admitted to the use of armed escort.
  “Through the local relief committees 2000 men for the north of the city and 1000 for the south have been called in by the clans or sub-clans there to act as a kind of ‘police force’. These guards protect the beaches where the off-loading is taking place, the main roads to the capital, the relief convoys and distribution points... It has, however, been agreed with the Somali Relief Committees that a small amount of the food brought in would be given to its members as “food for work”. The ICRC stresses that this is by no means a general rule, but is a result of the extremely chaotic situation in Somalia. After examining all possibilities the ICRC came to the conclusion that this was the only way to get food aid through to the victims.”

- 21 August, press release
  ICRC claimed that only a small amount of the food the ICRC brought in got looted. “40% of deliveries went to the kitchens, 40% for dry rations, 10% for food-for-work and 10% for security guards.”
  In the same press statement the ICRC came with a clear critique of other agencies for dumping food in a destructive fashion,
  “The ICRC must now call on aid organizations moving in to Somalia to co-ordinate their assistance and avoid mass air-dropping or dumping food. Otherwise the intricate system instigated by the ICRC after long and careful negotiations to distribute relief effectively within the country could be thrown into jeopardy. Somalia remains an extremely dangerous and volatile place and large quantities of food swamping the country in an uncontrolled fashion could quite easily spark off new security problems.”

- 26 November, press release
  ICRC issued a statement on “The policy line adopted by the ICRC regarding the possible arrival of foreign troops in Somalia. The ICRC notes that to help the victims of the tragedy in Somalia, humanitarian aid is no longer enough. The ICRC believes that a comprehensive political solution
is indispensable, and that implementation of such a policy rests with the community of States.... The ICRC concerns itself exclusively with its humanitarian mission. Security conditions must, however, be improved to enable it to carry out this mission satisfactorily.”
This can only be read as a admission of a loss of control, and a guarded acceptance of US/UN operation.
4.2 1992 Dan Church Aid

Dan Church Aid did not implement any projects in Somalia in 1992 (nor in 1997), but contributed money to the Lutheran World Federation and their operations. LWF was not implementing any projects in Somalia either, but had a co-ordinating role, collecting money from donors, procuring relief items and shipping them to Somalia, where a number of NGOs were responsible for the final distribution to the Somalis. A key person in the LWF operations, both into Sudan and Somalia was Bob Koepp, an American pilot and a committed, hard working, hard smoking, enthusiastic facilitator. While nobody has questioned Bob Koepp’s commitment to people in need in Somalia (and many other places) and his stamina in bringing help, his “go in and do something” methods has been criticised seriously by Mark Duffield et. al. in their review of the “Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium”, Feb. 19955. Bob Koepp describes himself today as a cowboy and a dinosaur, and after much controversy he has left Nairobi and the emergency work.

i) Dimensions of emergency

Indications of the dimensions of need were extremely vague from no figures at all or ‘thousands of lives are at stake’ to ‘4,5 million people are facing famine’.

- 29 February, appeal
  “SOMALIA AND HER PEOPLE ARE DYING IN A SEA OF MISERY AND SUFFERING!” Bob Koepp’s assessment in his “Emergency Assistance Appeal for Somalia,” faxed to 200 church charities under the LWF umbrella, including DanChurchAid on the same day Adrian Ratcliffe left for Mogadishu on a fact-finding mission on behalf of the Lutheran World Federation, i.e. not waiting for him to return five days later with an assessment.

- 3 March, press release
  In a press-stunt gearing up for the annual Dan Church Aid collection-day in Denmark, Chr. Balslev Olesen, head of Dan Church Aid, visited the Liboi refugee camp at the Kenya-Somali border. In a press statement he called for a six-week emergency assistance to Somalia and argued that airlifts were needed as a matter of urgency, “to save the needy and innocent people of Somalia, thousand of lives are at stake.”

- 18 March, appeal
  “In Somalia 4,5 million people are threatened by starvation.” Appeal for 8 mill. dkk.

- 24 March, appeal
  Dan Church Aid forwarded Bob Koepp’s letter of 29 Feb. verbatim with no attempt to specify needs and appealed for 2 mill. dkk.

- 10 July, appeal

5 Mark Duffield et. al. in their review of the “Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium”, Feb. 1995.
Dan Church Aid repeated the figure of 4,5 million people facing famine and their claim of “the worst African drought this century...20 million people endangered,” in an appeal for 5 mill. dkk more to the draught-stricken people in Ethiopia and Somalia.
- 25 August, 18 September, 10 November, appeals
Somalia was now an approved disaster; appeals were reduced to simple extensions of previous appeals, “Unfortunately, the catastrophic situation in Somalia appears not to be improving.. for further information please see our previous appeals.” (10 Nov.)

**ii) Causes of emergency**

*Dan Church Aid claimed civil war was the cause of the Somalia emergency in the first appeal (produced by Bob Koepp); in the subsequent consolidated appeals for several African emergencies drought became the main cause for the emergency in Somalia.*

- 29 February, appeal

“As a result of this lack of stability the Somali people at all levels are suffering a human tragedy.” Bob Koepp attached to his appeal two press reports from Mogadishu published the same day by AFP describing the ongoing civil war and clan conflicts in the capital. There were no mentioning of a drought neither in the press reports, the report filed by Ratcliffe on 10 March, nor in a report filed by Koepp’s special reporter John Parker on 2 April after a visit to Somalia 28-31 March.

- 14 March, press release

Dan Church Aid issued a press release on the eve of the collection-day now claiming a drought caused an immediate food-deficit affecting 17-20 million people including 4,5 million in Somalia: “Drought hits Africa hard. Dan Church Aid calls on the Danish people to support the annual collection “Bread to the World”. The effects of a persistent drought in these months hits large parts of East and Southeast Africa... Some countries are not only hit by drought but also disturbances and civil war, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Mozambique.”

- 18 March, appeal

In their appeal for 8 mill. dkk emergency aid to Somalia, Zimbabwe and Zambia drought was presented as the major threat.

- 24 March, appeal

Dan Church Aid forwarded unchanged Bob Koepp’s appeal of 29 Feb. Notable is the non-mentioning of drought jarring with the appeal sent 18 March and the public collection-campaign based on drought.

- 10 July, appeal

“Somalia is one of the countries [of East and Southern Africa] hit most severely by drought.” Arguments supporting this claim in their 5 mill. dkk appeal were non-existing: “The tragic conditions in Somalia will be all too familiar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
iii) Types of input

The main input provided by Dan Church Aid was air transport for other agencies.

Bob Koepp in his first appeal had suggested standard relief items such as foodstuffs, medicine, tents, plastic sheets, kitchen utensils, water-containers, water purification tablets, soap. However, the audited report clearly shows that the operation was a fly-service. The money went to ‘Southern Air Transport’ flight operators in Nairobi for chartering their Hercules planes. The cargo, paid for by other charities consisted of high-value foodstuff such as Unimix, powder milk, sugar, soy milk, and medicines.

Dan Church Aid’s hasty plan to charter a ship jointly with church charities in the rest of Scandinavia, unloading food-aid in Eastern and Southern African ports from Massawa in Eritrea down to Port Elizabeth in South Africa came to nothing.

From May 1992 to the end of 1995 DanChurchAid/LWF airlifted 25,000 tonnes of food and non-food items into Somalia, supported by Danida throughout, and in periods also by ECHO.

iv) Control of input

Neither Dan Church Aid, LWF nor SEOC had any control on the ground with the relief sent to Somalia.

- 24 March, appeal

The Dan Church Aid appeal completely disregarded the problems of distribution and control; it is stated clearly in the proposal that the aim is solely to transport food into Somalia, not to distribute it to the suffering Somalis, “[the aim is to provide] support in form of relief transport to existing agencies working on the ground in Somalia...To generally act as a logistical co-ordinating body.”

This worried the Ministry and after an exchange of letters with Dan Church Aid and Bob Koepp it was sufficiently calmed by a promise of SEOC to work close on the ground with SCF-UK. It was also promised that LWF would make frequent monitoring visits to the points of distribution; however, this was never carried out.

- April, 1997, Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal document

Five years after assisting in “the worst drought in hundred years” internal audit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that of the 20 mill. dkk Dan Church Aid received in 1992 for Somalia, 4.9 mill. dkk were never used. The money was later returned in small instalments with a accumulated interest of 0.8 mill. dkk.

- 15 July, 1997 Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal document

Five years after the big Somalia operation in 1992 DanChurchAid still had not completed the mandatory reporting and accounting on how they had used the Danish taxpayer money in Somalia. On the DCA letter appologising to the Ministry one of the Humanitarian Aid
department staff had scribbled angrily “Will that do?” [Er det så godt nok?] But both the Ministry and DCA were busy with new huge projects and no-one had any interest in making a row or displaying the Ministry’s minimal capacity of control.

Interview with Bob Koepp, emergency relief co-ordinator, Nairobi, 8 January 1999

- On how the LWF Somalia operation began:
“Our emergency operations [in Sudan] started off for two months but lasted for eight years. It developed into this massive multi-million dollar thing run by me and a couple of other people. In 1991 when Somalia came up there was a big problem, most Christian organisations did not know anything about Somalia because it is not a Christian country. It was the old story, who have we got out there? Hey Bob Koepp! He likes Somalia. We were the first to fly into Mogadishu just after Siad Barre had fled. We were the first people in this very unstable situation. They started shooting and we had to come back to Nairobi still with the cargo in the plane. It was January 1991; we said let’s leave it for a while. We came back in March 1992. We sent our appeals using pictures of starving children. You can call it moral blackmail; it’s not to me. I faxed appeals out to 200 organisations all over the world and the money were rolling in. It became a fly-fly thing. We did not need people on the ground, they were already there. The way we operate, it was like a business-deal. They would come to us and say can you give us a flight to x, y, z? We flew to 25 location, we did everybody! It was a monster that got out of hand.”

- On dimensions of the emergency:
“OK, we did not go in an do in-depth surveys and all that. These hungry kids they were survey enough to me! A lot of people used to critizise my reporting, saying it only showed tonnages. True I was not in the business of giving a philosophical discussion of why it is all happening. I mean we were told: get it there! Hell with that, it happened and it worked like the invasion of Normandy.”

- On causes of the emergency:
“Yes, in the triangle of death [Mogadishu-Baidoa-Kismayo], they had a famine, they lost a harvest, they got caught between the forces, the starvation was political.”
[But the official cause of an emergency can be changed to suit the situation. Bob Koepp gave en example from Sudan back in the 1980s]
“You know the Sudanese, there is no civil war officially, but there are flood-victims, right, so we were helping flood-victims for eight years.”

- On control of input:
“We were just doing simple logistics. I was not the person responsible once the things arrived. With Catholic Relief Service I think 80-90% got through, later it became worse. It was organised on the ground by these organisations. We wouldn’t be doing it if we realised that what we were taking was looted, we would have stopped. 1992 was pretty good to start with. We had no problems - sure we paid off the warlords, for each plane they got 300$, their boys off loaded everything, it was fine. Red Cross did the same thing. We didn’t need those guys [UNOSOM]. 300$ pr plane is cheap compared to 6 billion $ spent [on UNOSOM]. OK, when the whole place fell apart with this group against that group: how can you work in a situation like that? Beginning of 1993 it started getting really bad, very dangerous; kids would shoot just for fun.”

“In Juba [in South Sudan] we were the power. You became like a warlord yourself. You are as much a warlord as anybody else, a big man... Go ask the little guys. They still call planes ‘Bob’. They think I fly all the planes.”
Somalia 1997

From the middle of October 1997 the climatic phenomena ‘el Niño’ caused extreme rainfalls in the Horn of Africa, flooding large areas including the flat, fertile areas around Somalia’s two rivers Juba and Shabelle. Floods persisted until April 1998. 1 million people were estimated to have been affected by the floods, 250,000 people to have been displaced by the floods, and around 2,200 people to have died.

Thus, from the perspective of humanitarian aid Somalia in 1997 presented a double picture before and after November: rehabilitation activities in the grey zone between emergency and development before the floods and large-scale emergency aid to flood victims after the floods. From a socio-political perspective, however, the floods did not alter the situation substantially. There were no famine or war or large outside intervention in Somalia in 1997. Nevertheless, when comparing 1997 with 1992 a paradoxical picture emerges of a very stable instability. The regional distribution of zones of recovery, transition and crisis remains the same with Somaliland the leading area of recovery, enjoying a fragile peace and expanding state-structures; Puntland slowly building on a relative peace and rudimentary state-structures; central Somalia including Mogadishu locked in a shifting pattern of limited peace and limited violence; finally southern Somalia remaining very unstable, violent and poor partly because of the unfinished struggle for Somalia’s best agricultural land.

The international commitment to Somalia was low in 1997 because the hot-spots of global emergencies had shifted, for example to the Great Lakes Region, but of course it also reflected the troubling track-record from the past few years. Of the international agencies keeping up their presence in Somalia most worked out of Nairobi and had abandoned Mogadishu for security reasons. Hargeisa, on the other hand, experienced a small boom of agencies setting up a local office in spite of the continued international non-recognition of an independent Somaliland. According to the Minister of Planning 57 INGOs had opened offices in Hargeisa by the end of 1998.

A “Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation” was set up in early November three weeks after the onset of flooding in Somalia to co-ordinate the relief effort. UNICEF was assigned the role of lead agency and WFP provided logistics. ICRC was not officially part of the Inter-Agency Flood Response, but provided “a significant and complementary contribution”.6 The Flood Response raised more than the 13 mill. $ requested from donors. However public donations to the Flood Response were minimal. Also the distribution of funds

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6 Bradbury 1998.
was very unequal with the majority of contributions in cash and kind going to Juba, with the Shabelle area only receiving minimal proportions of resources raised.
4.3 1997 ICRC-IFRC-Danish Red Cross

In 1997 Somalia had been overshadowed by the crisis in the Great Lakes Region and ICRC and IFRC only carried on modest rehabilitation programmes in the grey zone between emergency assistance and development aid. In 1994 ICRC had transferred its delegation to Nairobi for security reasons. The IFRC 1997 total annual appeal for Somalia was 4.2 mill. chf; the ICRC total annual appeal for Somalia was 32 mill. cfr.

i) Dimensions of the emergency

*Neither dimensions of any general needs before the floods nor any specific needs of the flood victims were specified in the appeals. Only dimensions of project-targets were specified.*
- 24 January, appeal
Appeal for on-going programmes (3 mill. dkk to ICRC and 1 mill. dkk to IFRC). “Many people [are] still in emergency camps in various parts of the country,” however, “the number of internally displaced persons is large but in reality unknown, as they are nomads, constantly on the move.”
- 18 September, appeal
Appeal for 4 mill. to IFRC’s 26 health clinics serving 270,000 patients in Somalia. The appeal addressed specific needs and made a plausible assessment of funds needed to meet them. Appeal transferred to 1998 because of the floods.
- 13 November, appeal
Appeal for 2 mill. dkk to support flood-victims in Somalia and Ethiopia.
“It is impossible to assess the number of affected people.”

ii) Causes of the emergency

*Victims created by causes so obviously natural as not worth mentioning.*

iii) Types of input

*Various open-ended income generating activities; short-term emergency relief with high-protein biscuits, tarpaulins and medical supplies, medium-term rehabilitation of medical care, water provision and agriculture.*
- 15 March, press release
“The emphasis has moved, as far as possible, from emergency relief to supporting programmes that aim to stimulate economic activity and encourage self-reliance among affected communities. Main features include fisheries, and agricultural projects, rehabilitation and digging of wells, a tse-tse trap programme in the Juba valley, support for agricultural tools production by local blacksmiths, a goat-lending scheme in Somaliland and other projects to support the work of
local SRCS branches.” In 1997 ICRC only gave regular food assistance to orphanages, prisons and hospitals and particularly vulnerable families.
- 24 June, internal document IFRC Somali delegation

The centrepiece of IFRC activities in Somalia was 26 primary health clinics. May 1997 they saw a total of 65,522 patients.
- 11 November, press release

ICRC started airlifting shelters to areas in Gedo. Tarpaulins, blankets, and emergency food rations delivered by aeroplane.
- 1 December, press release

“Since the airbridge started on 11 November, ICRC teams have brought medical, food, shelter materials and blankets to over 90,000 people affected by flooding in Somalia.” Medium-term needs are seeds so that planting can be carried out as soon as flood-waters recede, medical supplies to reduce the risk of epidemics, access to safe drinking water. Total budget for 1997 was 22,9 mill. $.
- 17 February 1998, press release

“The ICRC has assisted 228,000 people affected by the heavy floods with high- protein biscuits, tarpaulins and medical supplies.”

iv) Control of input

Attempted monitoring by expatriates of clinics and emergency relief, however, in reality a high degree of self-control by the Somali beneficiaries.
- 24 June, internal document IFRC Somali delegation

“All 26 clinics are run by national staff and monitored by health officers from the branches and by the national health officer. As some of these clinics are hardly accessible for expatriates due to security reasons, there is still a need for monitoring on behalf of donors to be seriously considered.”

“The Evaluation Team found little evidence that much effort was put into monitoring distributions during or after Phase 1 [up to 31 Dec. 1997] of the relief operation beyond distribution points.” (p. 113) However, there was little looting of the supplies, perhaps because water denied access to looters.
Interview with Aisha Omar Maulana, IFRC-delegate in the IFRC-Somalia delegation, Nairobi 12 December 1998.

Aisha Maulana was supervising the primary health clinics supported by IFRC and responsible on a quarterly basis for getting medical supplies to Somalia.

- On the dimensions of the emergency:
  “The Somalia delegation in Nairobi get daily situation reports from our branches in Kismayo, Mogadishu and Garowe; they often ran “Everything calm, ten people dead.” Around the middle of October 1997 we got news of the floods. We don’t duplicate the other NGOs. We have a meeting and decide who is going to do what, then we alert our branch officers in Somalia to get a clear picture of what is needed. Out of all this information an emergency appeal will be made and sent to Geneva. They distribute the appeal to the national societies like Danish Red Cross which they in turn present to their governments. Money or pledges of money will be sent to Geneva. The Federation will then say to us we have got so much money. During the floods is the South the Federation only handled health and we sent additional medicines to the branches and sub-branches with boats and donkey-carts.

- On the causes of emergency:
  “I keep saying: don’t ask for money - you must pull up your socks. I am a Muslim woman from Africa [from Lamu, Kenya] - I can tell them. I ask them: how do you see your future? You should not always be the receiving. We have developed too much dependency. They are so used to ask for money. We have tried to make the Somalia Red Crescent get money from their own society, home and abroad. They must do some cost-recovery. In the foreseeable future a private health service is the only option; maybe the only solution is to ask for money from the patients. However, it is impractical to ask rural people to pay; you could then ask them for security. The SRC could do some fund-raising from abroad. The Somali community world-wide has more resources than the local people. They should make a ten-year plan for becoming self-reliant.”
  “But in fact, the biggest problem is the NGOs loosing their own jobs if they really pulled out. International humanitarian aid is a work-creation game. The system has to be maintained. The expatriates will feel obliged to keep funds running to themselves.”
  “In the end the food-relief goes to the people, maybe not as a free gift, they have to buy it. The warlords get rich by all the aid we pump in; we ought to close all aid. If we cut off all help then there is chance peace will come. On the other hand you cannot sit back and watch people suffer. It is a dilemma.”

- On types of input:
“IFRC bring in a standard kit to the Somalia Red Crescent branches in Kismayo, Baidoa, Mogadishu and Garowe, depending on the number of clinics and patients. Each kit supports 1000 people. IFRC supports 4 clinics in Kismayo; 2 clinics in Mogadishu (Afgoi and Balad); in Baidoa we have 4 clinics; in Galkayo 2 clinics. Each clinic employs a qualified nurse and a midwife from the local area. Supporting each clinic is a health committee of five people; the delegation is training them to take over the clinics. There are now appr. 100 clinics in the South by all NGOs taken together; before the war Siad Barre’s government had appr. 60 clinics.”

- On control of inputs:
Since the April 1998 hostage-incident in Mogadishu ICRC and IFRC have no expatriate personnel in Somalia. Supervision of the clinics is done by local staff and by expatriates from other NGOs. Aisha Omar had personally visited 2 clinics in Kismayo and the 2 in Mogadishu. The security situation prevented her from visiting the rest. Of the 12 clinics only the 2 in Galkayo were not monitored at all because of security. “Still, I would say we have no ghost clinics”

“We have had several incidents of looting of supplies en route to clinics, not particularly during the floods. It happened each time near to the clinics and we contacted the elders and they negotiated with the thieves or their parents or whoever, and in all cases we have recovered back almost everything. The users of the clinics put pressure on the thieves. We have down-scaled the contents of the kits. What they can steal from us is not the sexy drugs like injectables and infusions. In our kits we only have 2 types of antibiotics, drugs for malaria, worms and vitamins. Most of the time it is stolen by young militias who have noting better to do. They are eleven to fifteen years old with no education, they know nothing, a gun is their only thing and they try to play cowboys. The main reason we get things back is the community involvement in our clinics.”

“We are not outsiders, we build something that can survive when the international community pulls out. It is the long-term goal to hand over the clinics to a future Somali state or local community. We have less and less expatriates. We used to pay watchmen, but we have stopped that and said to the local people that it is their own problem to safeguard their local clinics.”
4.4 1997 Dan Church Aid

Dan Church Aid did not implement any projects in Somalia in 1997. They contributed to the ACT-umbrella under which a number of church charities worked on the ground in Somalia doing various rehabilitation projects and emergency aid during the floods November 1997-April 1998. One of these charities was DBG (Diakonia-Bread for the World-Germany). Due to the floods some of the rehabilitation projects appealed for and scheduled to be implemented in 1997 were transferred to 1998. I have included some of these although they were not fully implemented in 1997 for three reasons: they were on the table of Dan Church Aid and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1997, they illuminate the grey zone between emergency aid and development aid, and last but not least I had a chance to visit them in December 1998.

i) Dimensions of the emergency
No assessment of rehabilitation needs; emergency needs realistically estimated as 800.000 affected and 200.000 displaced.
- 2 September, appeal
No assessment of rehabilitation needs in the 2 mill. dkk appeal.
- 17 November, appeal
“800.000 people affected by the floods... 200.000 displaced... many drowned and even more people killed by snakebites and crocodiles.”
- 28 September, 1998, internal DBG letter
Jürgen Prieske, DBG wrote to Tina Hansen, DCA, “As a result of the mentioned better exchange rate DKK-USD in your favour we would like to increase the number of beneficiaries in the two districts [from 2.508 families to 3.024 families]. The needs are anyway much larger, than what we can do to assist these people along the river....”

ii) Causes of the emergency
Causes were identified as conflict, drought and rain.
- 2 September, appeal
“The drought this year has caused a serious lack of water and food... drought and continued internal conflict has caused prices to go up.”
The sloppy DCA introduction to the 2 mill. dkk rehabilitation appeal from DBG strikes a chord of general guilt-feeling and misery: “Since the UN-troops left the country not much interest has been invested in Somalia... most of the INGOs has left and the country is in a sorry state... In particular the inhabitants of Mogadishu live in state of insecurity with a weak and divided government [there was no government]...the airport, the port and several major roads are ruined by the wrath of war [not true, the airport and harbour were closed due to conflicting claims to control them, but not destroyed; both the southward and northward exit roads were in usable
shape] with the result that fresh produce hardly can be brought into the city [not true, on the markets of Mogadishu fruits, vegetables, and commodities from the outside world were abundant].”
- 17 November, appeal
“Large parts of Somalia are affected by floods and the consequences for the population are disastrous.”

iii) Types of input
A motley collection of items from the endless inventory of rehabilitation and development projects; basic relief items and some expensive Danish pumps.
- 2 September, appeal
Inputs proposed by DBG:
I/ Direct emergency aid: i) medical treatment in acute, critical situations; ii) distribution of foodstuffs in conjunction with income-generating activities; iii) distribution of protheses to amputees; iv) donations of rent and school-fees in short periods for vulnerable persons. The target group is IDP.
II/ Improvement of infrastructure: i) rehabilitation of irrigation canals; ii) rehabilitation of electricity-supply; iii) rehabilitation of markets. All projects aim at strengthening the private sector.
III/ Water-supply project: the taps will be protected by Somali business-men controlling the neighbourhoods.
- 5 November, press release
ACT had sent in 8 planes (DC3) from Nairobi to Gedo with 130 tonnes of rice, sugar, cooking oil, plastic sheets, blankets and kitchen utensils, distributed to 3000 people [families?].
- 17 November, appeal
The 1,5 mill. dkk appeal for assistance to flood victims forwarded Bob Koepp’s request for farm tools, seeds, pumps, rice, sugar, tea, and cooking oil.
- 31 December, Flood Response Evaluation Report
WFP and NGOs under the UN-directed relief operation, i.e. exclusive ACT and ICRC, had distributed in December 1997 1,805 tonnes of food in Bay, L. Shebelle and M. Shebelle by road; and 521 tonnes of food in Gedo, Hiraan, L. Juba and M. Juba by air.
- 1 October, 1998, internal DBG letter
Letter from Jürgen Prieske to Abukar Sheikh Ali (both from DBG),
“For the Food Security Project in Middle and Lower Shebelle Region we need to set up signs and flags to inform that the DBG is the implementing agency and the Project is financed by The People of Denmark (in English and Somali language, - see following draft by Frank Baum!).”

iv) Control of input
No control of emergency input was mentioned; rehabilitation monitored by DBG-personnel and protected by Somali business-men.

- 2 September, appeal

“Several times a week the projects will be monitored by DBG” [This did not happen]. “Distribution-points [for water] will be protected by Somali business-men, controlling the areas.”

- 30 November, 1998, internal DBG-report

Abukar Ali Sheikh wrote in the final report on the food security project, “Business people from Jowhar and Qoryoley were responsible for the transportation and security of the items... They were encouraged to keep up their business practices and they were the indirect beneficiaries of the project [by selling the relief items and services to DBG]. Through this strategy the risk of long distance transport and the looting of the items was avoided.”

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**Interview with Bodil Holmsgård, East Africa Regional Representative for Dan Church Aid in Nairobi, Nairobi 5 January 1999.**

“The floods of south Somalia started around 15 Oct 1997. I began to receive reports and called a joint meeting at the beginning of November 1997 [14 Nov.] in ACT and World Concern. We agreed to send an assessment mission to Juba and Shebelle. Then we sent a submission to ACT in Geneva, which then went out to all the national ACT organisations. 17 November 1997 a formal appeal from DCA reached the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of December planes arrived in Somalia with pumps, agricultural tools, foodstuffs (rice, sugar, tea and cooking oil). It was distributed by LWF, Norwegian and Swedish Church Aid by truck, boat or on foot. This relief operation went on until April 1998.”

I asked her how DCA/ACT terminates relief operations when the emergency is over. Significantly she misunderstood the question to mean how relief could *continue* after the emergency had ended using the new popular concept of rehabilitation.

“Rehabilitation is a grey zone between emergency and development. Norwegian and Swedish Church Aid both run permanent programmes. We try to create continuity. Not so many donors want to fund rehabilitation. It is a catastrophe, for example now in Kigali. The Sudan Emergency Assistance Consortium is a good example of capacity building, of continuity. The emergency assistance in the future will have to ask the local communities what they want from emergency aid. We have to develop the local capacities, they have to feel they own the projects. Education is the way ahead. We should co-operate with local NGOs like local churches.”

“We have to learn if our relief operations shall become better. Yet, you soon come to the fundamental question: shall we help? Of course, I think you shall. How could you let the civilian population down because they are ruled by a power hungry dictator? The main problem is corrupt regimes. We should put pressure on Danida to speak out against regimes like in Sudan,
Field observations of DBG projects in Qoryoley district, Lower Shabelle and Jowhar district, Middle Shabelle. December 1998.

Lower and Middle Shabelle

The districts along the Shabelle are some of the most fertile areas in Somalia. Italian colonialists developed irrigated agriculture using the labour power of the Bantu peoples living along the river, for example on banana-plantations. Far from being wealthy farmers, the Bantu have been at the bottom of the Somali social hierarchy, despised and subjected to many forms of exploitation and subjugation by the nomadic and dominant Somali clans. This reached terrible depths during the civil war, where the Bantu were the primary victims because invading clans, in particular Aideed’s Habar Gidir, in many ways denied them access to food. It was also mostly the riverine Bantu that suffered from the floods in 1997.

Almost everything built by groups larger than a family, i.e. by the state and companies, was destroyed in the towns in the Lower Shebelle region south of Mogadishu (as everywhere else). Ruins of factories, farms, public buildings and large structures of every kind were empty shells uninhabited even by squatters. Some fifty kilometres out of Mogadishu paved roads were more or less destroyed and all traffic except animals used improvised dirt tracks impassable during the rainy season.

The DBG food security project, funded by Danida, targeted 3024 poor families in Lower and Middle Shebelle (18.000 persons), some of whom became victims of the 1997 floods. It consisted of provision of 3024 sets of agricultural hand tools, provision of 604 tonnes of beans and maize distributed as food for work, preparation of 3024 hectares of agricultural land (1 hectare pr. family), and finally the provision of 45 tonnes of seed consisting of beans, maize and sesame. The budget was 2 mill. dkk. and it was implemented in October-November 1998.

In the DBG team there were no Bantus. Indeed there was an element of clan and urban patronizing in the whole project implementation. Abukar remarked that hundred years ago the...
Bantu lived like monkeys. Also today the nomadic clans living in the same areas habitually let their herds graze on the fields of the Bantu, destroying the crops. “We Abgal are the looters of the Bantu,” Abukar continued jokingly, as we approached one of the small villages along the river with our two four-wheel drive cars and eight heavily armed guards.

Plants were sprouting on the fields from the donated seeds, but lack of rain worried the villagers. They took us down to the river to see the clogged up irrigation canals. One elder said the young people didn’t know how to work hard. The Siad Barre state gave them a job and they all went to the city. Once they made their own canals. Now they could not do that. But discussing the problem of the canals a bit further it turned out one NGO (they did not remember which one) four years ago rehabilitated their canals; now they were clogged up again. The ruined only stone house in the village had been a “Casa”, a state agricultural marketing board storehouse. Everybody I spoke to were happy it was gone because the state did not pay well for their produce, but on the other hand they were unhappy it was looted because now there was no more electricity to the irrigation-pumps.

Qorioley
Ali Husein Alio Ebrou, Qorioley District Commissioner, spoke at a dinner in Qorioley town 14 December 1998. He thanked for the help given by DBG and The Danish People and appealed for help, first of all with the repair of 1 kilometre road-connection from Shebelle bridge to the highway that was impassable during rains and rehabilitation of 15 kilometre of the Liban irrigation Canal to secure farming during droughts. Second in importance was farm cultivation, soil preparation with tractors in areas with heavy grass; food for work, tools and seeds; relief to 2000 refugee-families from Bay, Bakool and Somali refugees from Ethiopia, and maybe Qorioley could be twinned with a town in Denmark?

Jowhar
In Jowhar district I visited some villages by the Shebelle river; one called Moyko was still flooded and 1050 families were displaced, most to Jowhar town. People were dying from hunger around Jowhar, we were told. After touring the area, including the utterly ruined and looted sugar factory built with Cuban help, once Somalia’s largest productive unit, a sumptuous dinner had been arranged by DBG for the local leaders at the InterSOS compound in Jowhar. Twenty men ate rice and meat. Hassan Nur Hassan, acting governor of Middle Shebelle, member of the elders council, chairman of the water supply company in Jowhar rose and specifically requested assistance from Denmark (since I was there) to stop the gaps in the river banks in order to prevent further flooding, and to repair the bridge and the road to Mogadishu. While people drifted out of the steaming hot hall he continued,
“Many international organisations have come here. DBG is the best. It was the only organisation that supplied sugar, oil and rice, not only maize and sorghum like the other organisations. We hope DBG and Denmark will continue to help us. We have many marooned villages and displaced people in Jowhar district. 5000 families are eating grass at the moment. We made a collection of one kilo of grains from each family with food. But we cannot continue without international help. What we really would like is DBG to open an office in Jowhar.”

Mohamad Osman, police commander in the district of Jowhar spoke next.
“I promise as police commander security. But all over the world crime happens. We are not special. We have a fertile land, we don’t always depend on donors. We just want an incentive. The best thing would be a DBG settlement in Jowhar. DBG has a good reputation among the grassroots. Thank you.”

For Abukar Sheikh Ali, the DBG project manager, it was important to demonstrate to me that the village people knew Denmark had donated relief to them, and he showed me pictures from the distribution of the relief with all the Danish flags and signboards he had set up on the trucks, on the village huts and in the fields. In every village we visited he would examine the village leaders on this question; yet few had any idea of something called Denmark. In one particular village Abukar tried very hard to get the leader to name the NGO and the country that had provided his village with help. But the man had no idea of where the help had come from. I was very curious to know what the village leader had thought when suddenly humanitarian assistance descended on his village. He was clearly very nervous in front of me, Abukar and the security people. He did not understand my question, but he sensed that Abukar and I were people with the power to donate help if he said the right thing. “Now,” I said, trying to explain my point, “if suddenly some Somalis came to Denmark and donated me a car, then I would wonder why did they give that to me, and not to my neighbour; why me?” Finally after much thinking the man gave an answer which was, I think, very illuminating.
“First everybody in the village had been very scared when Abukar had arrived with cars and militias to make an assessment. Were they the looters? People had hid in the huts. But then Abukar and his men had done no harm, and after many visits he had understood that some people very, very far away had given them these things (food, tools, seeds).”
But why did he think he had been chosen to receive these gifts, I insisted.
“Well of course, Allah had finally heard my prayers!” the man answered.

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Interview with Abukar Ali Sheikh, programme manager of DBG in Mogadishu, Mogadishu 18 December 1998.
Abukar was effectively director in the semi-permanent absence of Jürgen Prieske from the Mogadishu office. Abukar Sheikh was also a leading business man. He appeared to be running the programmes in a most competent and efficient manner. In an interview in his office he explained how the Danida-funded programmes were implemented.

“We cannot deal with the whole need for help; we have selected the six districts in Lower and Middle Shabelle near rivers with irrigation where we support the poorest 3000 families with food, tools and seeds. Before the programme started we spent two years assessing the needs. To know who is poor we take the advice of the elders and local authorities. Our executive teams from Mogadishu had consultations in every village in Qorioley and Jowhar districts and the teams choose the advice if the elders were not corrupt.”

“We are not asking the people themselves if they are poor or not. We are looking ourselves and by the advice of the elders, but not from the poor themselves. Of course there are many people who seems not to be the poorest who always strive to be [counted as] the poorest, but we did not accept their sayings. We implement anything in a diplomatic way, we also have our security [force] that can protect the food we give to the poor people.”

[In one of the visited villages I was told how the villagers had been very scared when the DBG teams first arrived in their big cars with their armed guards and for a long time they hid in their huts; how did Abuser make people calm?]

“The last eight years Somalia experienced something which is very terrible to be expressed in words. You see, the people living by the river are marginalised Bantu. They are afraid for us thinking we are the looters. But after a time, when we had visited them many times they found out that we will give them something and not steal from them, they trusted us. They are happy and they welcome us.”

“When the floods came we used boats to know the situation. We went to Jowhar and informed UNICEF. The needs was more than we could do. In Qorioley 2000 families are displaced from Bay and Bakool; they need emergency aid. In Jowhar district 4 villages are marooned and the people are displaced to Jowhar town; they lost everything. 5000 families in Jowhar are eating grass, they come from the marooned villages and they need emergency aid. First of all they need food so they don’t die; then shelter and help to refurbish their land. To raise their standard of living they need development aid. Six or seven years supply and I believe a good number will raise their standard of living.”
Field observations of DBG projects in Mogadishu. December 1998.

In Mogadishu I visited a water-supply installation, a hospital, a school, and a street-light project. Two general observations can be suggested: i) to be a beneficiary of the services provided by these projects was fully comparable to winning in a lottery. The winners were happy but they are very few. However, the donors strove to do more than run a lottery and they all had an ambition of strategic rehabilitation, i.e. to implement sustainable state-like services in fields like health, education, and infrastructure. ii) the local structures of violence giving or denying individual Somalis access to the lottery were more or less impossible to touch, i.e. there was no realistic formula for implementing state-like authorities like police and army. The result was extremely low sustainability of the services and grossly inequitable access to them.

Afgoye Water Wellfield
Afgoye Water Wellfield 25 km outside Mogadishu was a large water supply-scheme for Mogadishu. It was constructed 1979-82, financed by the European Union and the World Bank as a strategic investment in development. It was maintained up to 1991 by a Danish company called Comwell. It consisted of a small oil-fuelled power plant, a high-voltage transmission line to the 30 well-pumps and a water pipe network into Mogadishu.

A group of businessmen had for several years protected the site with arms and repulsed looters with people killed on both sides. In keeping with normal Mogadishu practice in the caretakers room some ten light and heavy automatic rifles were at hand and the whole area was constantly patrolled by armed guards.

The water scheme was run by private businessmen from Mogadishu. Mr. Abdullahi Dhegoweyne, Afgoye Water Wellfield Coordination Chairman, told me that the power plant was the only public installation that had survived the civil war and the subsequent looting. One of the three big diesel-generators was salvaged when it was left behind by UNOSOM. He asked the international community for an ‘incentive’ of fuel for the power plant, and said, “We hate politics and warlords, please stop funding them. We lack a government. We don’t know when it will come, we are so tired of politics.”

I said water is also politics, and everybody laughed in agreement. Indeed, his group had held meetings with all clan leaders and warlords and got separate letters of acceptance from each faction. Now it was of commercial interest for businessmen. December 1998 one bottle of water cost 2000 Sh. (0,25$) and pumped water could be sold for 1000 Sh. pr. litre. distributed from the wellfield by donkey chart. Almost all distribution pipes in Mogadishu had been looted, and tap water was a pipe dream.
The wellfield team had apparently technical expertise to run the wells, and it looked extremely well organised including their sparepart-stores, compared with all other service installations I saw in Mogadishu. Obviously they were sitting on a potential money-making machine and they were prepared to continue using violence to protect it. In the budget submitted by DBG to Danida 2. September 1997 3.7 mill. dkk was specified for the wellfield rehabilitation (including a high overhead to local administration of 15%). The largest budget item was technical equipment (2.3 mill. dkk). Everybody in Mogadishu needed good water, and to the extent people could pay for the water they would benefit. Obviously the business-men running the wells would be the immediate beneficiaries; violence determined that. Sustainability for such a capital-intensive installation, however, was questionable given the volatile situation in Somalia.

Martini Hospital
The Martini Hospital was not functioning anymore. It was Somalia’s first hospital built by the Italians in the 1920s in old Mogadishu. The buildings were empty shells but they housed approximately 120 war-invalids from the 1978 Ogaden war, their families and a number of squatters. When I visited it around fifty invalids in wheelchairs were sitting in the shade under trees waiting for their one daily meal. I was told some 1500 people lived in the large hospital area. Food was prepared in a monster pot over an open fire in the ruins of the former hospital kitchen. DBG (DCA) had funded the food up to now and the construction of a concrete water cistern. One of the invalids told me they had been in the hospital for twenty years; their suffering during the civil war could not be described, he said. Many of the men in the wheelchairs looked better fed than those with legs.

Imam Malik School
Imam Malik School in central Mogadishu had 2000 pupils including 750 girls. They studied in two shifts thought by 35 teachers (average class quotient of 57). In the school compound there was also an orphanage for 200 children, and a health clinic with an OPD. The buildings were low, simple structures, but well-kept with tables and blackboards. The school looked well organised and clean. A Kuwaiti NGO “The African Muslim Agency”, paid the teachers salaries, their ‘incentives’ as it was called. The principal explained to me, “So the teachers don’t loot the school.” The parents paid for books and school uniforms, black trousers and white shirts for boys and green chadors for girls.

CARE had rehabilitated the old school, destroyed by fighting and looting, and DBG, partly funded by Dan Church Aid, had build 12 new class rooms, plus rooms for an orphanage with a Koran-school, and two septic tanks. The clinic treated children from the school and the orphanage and the neighbourhood; like everywhere in south Somalia the main problems were TB, malaria, and bronchitis. Rich Muslim Somalis paid for the medicine. ‘Incentives’ for the
nurses were paid by the Kuwaitis. Because of the acute lack of schools in Somalia it was a rare privilege for children to be admitted to the school. Less than 5% of the children of Mogadishu attended school; far less in the rural areas according to the director of the school, Mr. Abdi Mohamad. He decided after talking with the parents whom to admit. The man from DBG, visiting the school with me told me he had 8 children, including one daughter and two sons attending the school.

Of course, resumed fighting in Mogadishu could ruin the school again, but with peace it looked well set to be sustainable because it was based on parents with money and good connections to both Muslim and Christian charities. Helping one school was better than helping no-one, and the children milling around in the school-yard decorated with big murals showing Somalia’s Muslim faith and bonds with Arabia, were clearly winners in a lottery with very high stakes.

Street lights
One evening I was taken on a drive with my guards to see the DBG street-light project in Mogadishu. Since the civil war there had been no electricity in the city except for private generators belonging to a few rich people and expatriates. All electric wires had been looted, even underground wires had been dug up and sold as scrap (leaving many roads impassable with criss-crossing trenches). DBG/DCA has donated a small sum (a part of 0.5 mill. dkk budgeted to ‘infrastructure’ in the 2. Sep. 1997 appeal) to provision of street-light on certain main roads. Wires had been replaced very crudely on street posts (protected against new looting by lots of barbed wire) in six different parts of the city and connected to generators owned by six private business-men commercially selling electric power to a few near-by shops, enterprises and private houses. For example parts of Balad Road and Armed Forces Road in north Mogadishu were now illuminated for a few hours every evening by electricity coming from Abukar Ali Sheikh’s generator (himself project co-ordinator for DBG). DBG paid for wires and fuel, and Abukar (and the other business-men) donated power to the street-lamps. People were very happy for this, it improved security and was good for business.

I found this a very innovative rehabilitation project (much better than an expensive street-light rehabilitation-project I saw 1992 in Luanda, Angola funded by SIDA, complete with new lamp-posts and expensive armature) because it was extremely basic, building on primitive but existing resources which had protection. Like the water project most people could benefit from the light, even if business-men were the immediate beneficiaries. It did not provide services which built on expensive installations challenging local structures of violence by new looting. The business-men could protect their installations with their private militias (Abukar also had his own security-force). Expensive installations would generate new violence as long as no central authority existed.
4.5 1997 UNHCR

The UNHCR effort in Somalia was for political-institutional reasons divided between an office in Hargeisa, referring directly to Geneva and dealing with the Northwest, i.e. Somaliland, and a regional office in Nairobi, dealing with Northeast, Central and South Somalia. For political reasons linked to the non-recognition of Somaliland’s independence UNHCR repatriation only took place from Kenya to south Somalia and not from Ethiopia into Somaliland. UNHCR only began a repatriation programme to Somaliland in February 1997.

i) The dimensions of the emergency
446,560 Somali refugees living in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen.
- 10 June, appeal
The UNHCR Programme for the Voluntary Repatriation and Reintegration of Somalia Refugees in 1997 estimated 446,560 Somali refugees were living in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. The programme announced the plan to repatriate 100,000 refugees from Ethiopia, 35,000 from Kenya, 1,000 from Djibouti and 3,000 from Yemen; a total of 139,000 refugees. Budget for the consolidated appeal was 18.9 mill. $ for on-going repatriation and 7.7 mill. $ for joint UN reintegration projects in Somalia.
- 15 August, appeal
In a follow-up of the 10 June appeal UNHCR wrote to the Danida “The Cross-Border Operation from Kenya since 1992 has assisted 155,000 Somali refugees to repatriate to Gedo, Lower Juba Valley and to Northeast Somalia. From Yemen a further 2,000 were assisted to repatriate in 1996 and early 1997. Since 1991, an estimated 400,000 Somali refugees have spontaneously repatriated from camps in eastern Ethiopia to north-western Somalia.” UNHCR Geneve went on to request 5 mill. dkk. for the repatriation and reintegration of Somali refugees from Ethiopia; Denmark complied.

ii) The causes of the emergency
Conflict.
- 10 June, appeal
Conflict forced people to seek refuge away from their place of origin outside and inside Somalia; relative peace enable Somali nationals to return to their places of origin.
iii) Types of input

Transport and short-term rehabilitation.
- 15 August, appeal

“Organising and assisting the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees who express the desire to return home; supporting the reintegration of returnees upon their arrival in Somalia.”

Reintegration objectives in Somaliland were listed as protection and demining, the provision of water and sanitation, adequate shelter and health facilities, education, the creation and strengthening of income-earning activities for vulnerable persons, female and sibling headed households, community services, public infrastructure, improvement of agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and environment, and community awareness in peace and reconciliation activities; however travel arrangements constituted the largest part of UNHCR’s budget for Somalia.

iv) Control of input

Control of refugee movement and protection of refugees by administrative agreements.
- 10 June, appeal

“In support of the actual repatriation movement, UNHCR and the concerned authorities, as well as the refugees, have undertaken several initiatives, mostly related to refugee protection, which include the following: information campaigns, elders’ visits, tripartite meetings, memoranda of understanding with host governments, conclusion of sub-agreements, registration for voluntary repatriation, transportation arrangements, provision of food and non-food items.”

Interview with Kalunga S. Lutato, head of Somali operations at UNHCR regional office in Nairobi, Nairobi 6 January 1999.

- On dimensions of the emergency,

In 1997 the 130,000 Somali refugees in Kenya were located in two camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, both close to the Somali border and far from populated areas; this was a drop from the peak of 400,000 Somali refugees in 1992. 270,000 refugees had returned 1992-1997 from Kenya, of these around 85,000 had returned spontaneously, i.e. not assisted by UNHCR.

- On the causes of the emergency,

In line with the growing UNHCR emphasis on repatriation one of his main concerns was the repatriation of the Somalia refugees in Kenya. In Kenya refugees were generally considered to be a source of crime and this had been an important factor in the recent decree by Pres. Moi to close all camps in the vicinity of Mombassa. Kalunga Lutato also pointed to the historical circumstance that ethnic Somalis in Kenya were seen as a potential threat to the integrity of Kenya by coalescing with the Somalis living in Kenya and fueling secessionist demands. To prevent a replay of the “shifting-wars” from the early sixties the refugees were kept strictly inside
the camps. Before the UNHCR could close down the last camps in Kenya the areas where the
refugees come from must be made peaceful.
“We cannot do it now, perhaps the camps have to be sustained 10 years or more waiting for
peace to come everywhere in Somalia.”

- On types of input
UNHCR tried to prepare for the returnees by QIPs (Quick Impact Projects).
“For the Bajunis [a small minority living on islands off the Kismayo coast, and the only people
among the Somalis to repatriate in 1997 and 1998 from Kenya] we try to install civil order by
assisting the police with a new head quarter and a new prison. We provide water, we plant to
stop the desert, we distribute seeds. We tried to create a livelihood for them by drilling a water-
well and donating a few small boats. The Bajunis being a tiny minority group had repeatedly
been looted by the militias from the larger groups; they were always the losers in the civil war.
We try to start some income-generating and set up a local administration.”
Whether peace could be sustained in the areas of reintegration inside Somalia after the expire of
the QIPs Lutato said someone with a much longer perspective must take over. He could not
answer that question.

- On control of input
Mr. Lutato could not pinpoint what the Danish donations to UNHCR had been used for in
Somalia. Only if donations were given to specific projects was this possible, or if the donor
requested flags etc. on the sites of end use. For example the Japanese often requested this, but
not the Danish government. He took up his present post in 1997 and had no first-hand
information on earlier operations; all files concerning matters up to 1996 had been cleared from
the Nairobi office [!]. He did not know which old files were kept in Geneva.

I went to Hargeisa to look for the UNHCR projects. Unfortunately, I did not see the refugees
coming back on the UNHCR convoys as they were suspended just two days before I arrived.
The Sheikh Nur squatter/returnee camp, a vast area of round shelters built by sticks and blue
UNHCR plastic sheets on a rocky hill outside Hargeisa, was planned for 2500 UNHCR
returnee families and laid out in sites of 12 times 20 metres. Yet, only 40% were UNHCR-
returnees, the rest was spontaneous returnees and rural migrants including a growing number of
refugees from the South, i.e. the rest of Somalia. The Somaliland government considered them
foreigners not covered by the relief programmes for Somalilanders. The influx caused a severe
strain on the still ruined municipal services, in particular the water supply, but above all, people
said to me, it threatened the extremely sensitive clan geographies of the town, with returnees
from different clans clustering in separate parts of the town, such as Sheikh Nur, around the Stadium and up on the Airport hill. The Somaliland Minister of Planning, Mr. M.S. Mohamed, emphasized, in a telephone conversation I had with him from Denmark, that no official distribution of refugees according to clans took place.

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Interview with Guido Ambroso, field/repatriation officer UNHCR Hargeisa, Hargeisa, 25 November 1998.

In a tense atmosphere two days after the Somaliland government had suspended all UNHCR repatriation Guido Ambroso was interviewed in his office.

- On the dimensions of the emergency,

In 1991 630,000 Somali refugees lived in eastern Ethiopia, by the end of 1997 the number was reduced to 242,000. However, only a minute fraction had been repatriated by UNHCR. While close to 400,000 refugees spontaneously repatriated to Somaliland or sifted back into Ethiopia during the period 1992-1997, none were repatriated by UNHCR 1992-1996 and only 5,430 Somalis in 1997 and 18,134 in 1998.

Guido Ambroso estimated that half of the remaining refugees constituted a residual group that would not voluntarily repatriate. Low caste people, groups like leather-workers, metal-workers, and barbers considered low by the general society, many of whom Siad Barre had empowered.

“But there is a subtle line between discrimination and persecution and some of these people that fled in 1991 had now returned. That is an encouraging sign.”

- On causes for the emergency,

In 1988 Hargeisa and other Somaliland towns were destroyed by Siad Barre’s troops and almost all the inhabitants fled to Ethiopia; since 1991-93 when the civil war ended they have largely repatriated. Town-people from Hargeisa owning property were among the first to repatriate spontaneously and reclaim their property, while people from still unsafe and ruined Borama remained in the camps. Many nomadic families had split, with the men leaving the refugee camps to look after their herds, while women and children remained and received the camp-provisions.

“When Somaliland got secure people came back, but if a new problem comes up people will flee again and we are back to square one.”

- On types of input,

“The camps were a massive input in the local areas. Do too much, and people come flooding. Do too little and people suffer.”
Refugees were counted as cardholders; many so-called “card-lords”, locals holding several cards, had infiltrated the camps. Under the UNHCR repatriation programme a refugee first had to surrender his or her ration-card, second they would receive food for nine months, 30 $ pr. person, plastic sheets, jerry cans and blankets, a total expense of 140$ pr. person, and thirdly transport was arranged by hiring private trucks and minibusses.

“Repatriation is a good song to the international community because the long term costs gets down.”

- On control of input,
The input of UNHCR in terms of repatriation was influenced by factors over which UNHCR had little direct control. UNHCR had to co-operate with the local authorities, in this case the Hargeisa government. On 23 November after weeks of discussions it decreed a stop to the UNHCR repatriation programme of Somali refugees from Ethiopia. They gave two official explanations: economic problems due to a Saudi ban on import of livestock from Somaliland and the so-called Hargeisa-problem. The reintegration of refugees obviously was affected negatively by the livestock ban causing a general economic depression, but was it plausible to be felt suddenly in November some ten months after the imposition of the ban in February 1998?

“Repatriation is a strategic objective for UNHCR. The problem awaiting us is when there are no more voluntary repatriatees. That is when the problem starts. This could happen in the second half of 1999. We can say to the refugees staying in the camps: “OK, you can stay if the Ethiopians want you - but don’t count anymore on goods from the international community.” My personal feeling is we should tell people, “You have one month to take the package - assistance is suspended!”

“The Somaliland government must understand that one day the international community will close off the tap to the camps in Ethiopia, and then the Somalis will come back anyway. Food is the crux of the matter. Temporary assistance should be applied in Somaliland.”

“Refugees act in a perfectly rational manner. If the provisions handed out in the camps are better than what one is likely to get upon returning you stay; if, on the other hand, your prospects are better on returning, you go back.”

Guido Ambroso added that almost no-one repatriated voluntarily from Europe even though returnees from Europe got 10 to 15 times the assistance than the returnees from Ethiopia; in 1997 UNHCR had less than 100 voluntary returnees from Europe. He emphasized that rejectees were not the business of UNHCR.
“Only IOM deals with that. Touching that would ruin our co-operation with Somaliland completely.”

But it was not just a question of staying or returning; where the returnees settled was a very sensitive question. Guido Ambroso gave me figures clearly showing the urban trend (see box 4 below). The “actual” figures were the number of people observed to be present in the convoys as opposed to the official number of people who surrendered ration cards in exchange for the repatriation package. The balance could be assumed to represent “locals” who dispersed in and around the camp without crossing into Somalia. Guido Ambroso pointed out that the “actual” figure did not take into account the possibility of back-flows into the camps. As a result the number of people in Borama and Baki may be even lower than the “actual” figures.

The “Hargeisa-problem” was a name put on this rapid demographic changes caused by large-scale squatting in and around Hargeisa. The returnees drifted towards Hargeisa and Gabiley and did not return to the small towns and rural areas where they had fled from. The move of UNHCR returnees towards Hargeisa was part of a general tendency of urbanisation. Guido Ambroso argued that the civil war had only delayed a world-wide process of urbanisation and maintained that the returnees had the freedom of movement. Yet, the Somaliland government strongly disputed this and maintained that the UNHCR had to co-operate with the government in curbing the growth of Hargeisa.

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**Box 4. Somali repatriation from Ethiopia; statistics and projections by district.**

(5th UNHCR update)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return to: Official</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
<td>5,748</td>
<td>51,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabiley</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>13,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borama</td>
<td>3,087</td>
<td>27,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilla (Baki)</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbera</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burao</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,251</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual performance of UNHCR in 1997 did not remotely live up to the stated ambitions in the 1997 Programme. Only 5707 Somalis were repatriated in 1997; 277 persons by the Nairobi office and 5,430 persons by the Hargeisa office. The UNHCR Nairobi performance in
particular was remarkably low: 0.79% of the target of 35,000 was achieved, while UNHCR in Hargeisa achieved 5.43% of the stated goal of 100,000 repatriated Somalis.

The minimal achievements of UNHCR raises the question of why UNHCR published so wildly over-optimistic targets: poor judgement of outer constraints and inner strength? Were targets cynically inflated in order to get what was needed for a much more limited job? Whatever the internal reasons for the disappointingly few people repatriated in 1997, the fact also points to constraints over which UNHCR exercised little direct control: i) funding, ii) behaviour of the receiving state, and iii) behaviour of the refugees.

On 10 June, 1997 UNHCR had only received one single contribution for the Somalia repatriation programme, and it was “seriously hampered by lack of funding.” (Ernest Chipman, Head of Funding and Donor Relations Service). However, UNHCR carried on using funds received for Somalia in 1996. Half of the funds actually received in 1996 were not spent in that year, indicating that the problem of high targets and limited performance may not have been limited to 1997.

Since 1996 only around 60,000 Somali refugees have been repatriated world-wide by UNHCR. The 1997 UNHCR performance represented a repatriation of around 1% of the global half a million Somali refugees. Obviously those remaining in the camps were those with the least incentive to return for security, economic, or ethnic-political reasons. Were the inputs planned by UNHCR appropriate for this difficult group of potential returnees, 57% of whom were under 18 years of age, and perhaps had little sense of home?
4.6 1997 Danish Refugee Council

Danish Refugee Council was created in 1956 to assist Hungarian refugees in Denmark and became eventually one of the major Danish NGOs. DRC was unique in having both big relief projects in the countries where the refugees came from like Bosnia and Afghanistan, and running a large semi-official integration service for refugees in Denmark.

Denmark had admitted around 10,000 Somali refugees 1992-1997. The return of rejected asylum-seekers in particular Somalis had by 1997 become a hot political issue in Denmark. On 11 June 1997 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Danish Premier Minister, promised on television to send back all Somalis staying in Denmark without asylum or residence permit. Two weeks later an official delegation travelled to Hargeisa to negotiate an agreement on the return of rejected asylum-seekers. On 6 July the director of the humanitarian aid office in the MFA, Mr. Ole Moesby signed a ‘statement’ with the Somaliland minister for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, promising to “help people improve their living standards.”

When he returned home with this document the government came under heavy fire for planning a trade in humans and the 60 mill. dkk requested for development projects in Somalia was voted down in Parliament on 11 September. However, on the same day the Minister administratively granted 4 mill. dkk for a DRC emergency/pilot rehabilitation project in Somalia. On 18 February 1998 a slightly altered Danida request for 60 mill. dkk was passed through parliament and on 20 March 1998 DRC appealed for 8 mill. dkk for an extension of their refugee-reintegration project in Somalia. However, the fate of the agreement of returning rejectees was filled with problems and eventually it was scrapped completely by Somaliland on 23 January 1999 after a total of only seven Somalis had been forced back to Somaliland from Denmark. (See also section 5.3.2. below on the confidential advise from other states on this issue).

i) Dimensions of the emergency,

280,000 Somali refugees in camps in eastern Ethiopia.
- 3 August, appeal
“280,000 refugees distributed in 8 camps on the Ethiopian side of the border, including some of the most vulnerable with nothing in Somaliland to return to.” DRC 4 mill. dkk application for pilot rehabilitation activities in Somaliland.

ii) Causes of the emergency,

Internal clan fighting.
- 3 August, appeal
“The declaration of independence [of Somaliland] in 1991 resulted in the spontaneous return of 400,000 refugees. However, internal fighting erupted between groups of clans in 1994, in particular around the towns of Hargeisa and Burao, causing yet another movement of refugees to Ethiopia.”

iii) Types of input.
Medium-term rehabilitation.
- 3 August, appeal
“The rehabilitation of schools, health clinics, secondary roads and other basic infrastructure; water supply rehabilitation, income-generating activities, local community capacity building, support of NGOs, authorities, including training and delivery of equipment.”
- 3 March 1998, appeal
“Activities in the areas of reintegration, infrastructure and education will constitute a contribution to stability and reconciliation; schools, women’s centres, clinics and sanitation; water, income-generating projects, capacity building; to establish connection between the work in Northwest Somalia and the situation for the Somali refugees in Denmark.”

iv) Control of input.
Resident expatriate.
- 3 August, appeal
“The first six months are expected to constitute an identification, establishment, and pilot phase, where activities within the four main areas will be tested [by the resident project co-ordinator].”

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Interview with Helga Griffin, project co-ordinator, Danish Refugee Council, Hargeisa.
Hargeisa 20 November 1998.
- On dimensions of the emergency
“There are needs everywhere; we had to select projects fitting with our mandate, for example focusing on displaced persons. We select projects proposed to us by local people by excluding areas where other NGOs are active and by insisting on good local partners, there have to be credible, powerful local groups to receive our inputs.”

- On causes of the emergency,
“The internal clan-wars of 1994 in Hargeisa and 1996 in Burao are fresh in peoples minds. Everything depend on preventing new conflicts. That is why we said yes to support a peace-building initiative with a small sum of $5000 even if it was a bit outside our mandate. The Gurti, the Elders’ house, wanted to send three delegations of ten elders each to volatile Sool and Sanac
districts for a period of one months to speak with the local elders. The trip was a success, reconciliation worked this time!”

- On types of input

“We do physical rehabilitation of water supplies, schools, mother&child health clinics, and sanitation, and we do several income-generating projects. In one district we donated a tractor to a co-operative. They hire out the tractor and generate an income supplementing their personal income from vegetable and animal agriculture. 30% is a donation and 70% is paid to a revolving fund, i.e. the co-operative has to pay back the money.

In another district we support a community of 126 farmers on fertile riverbed land. The community had elected a committee that approached us in Hargeisa asking for help to develop gardening. They had selected 7 families as the poorest and most deserving. I visited them and rejected one nominee for being absent and one for cultivating qat. The remaining five families received a grant and a donation to be paid back to a revolving fund. One objective in selecting this project was to keep these people on the land and prevent them from drifting into Hargeisa.

We have supported a women’s group that began cultivating henna and developed a small scale business in Hargeisa; normally henna is imported, so this little project was both income-generating and import-substituting. We have supported with a small loan a women’s co-operative buying milk from nomads, trucking it to Hargeisa and selling it on the Hargeisa market.”

- On control of input

Helga Griffin emphasized that control depended on being on the spot. After the FMA had appointed a Danida officer to the embassy in Nairobi with responsibility for Somalia projects reporting routines had been strengthened, which she welcomed. Reflecting on the impact of DRC in Hargeisa, still in the very early phase, she said,

“If we were not here it would perhaps not make the big difference in money terms. We have a stabilizing effect; we come from the outside world, we are a mirror the Somalis can see themselves in. Our presence, I believe, is our biggest contribution.”
4.7 Conclusion: constraints of NGO performance

The review above of a limited sample of agency-performance suggests the following conclusion: Agencies constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid and thus the possible peace-inducing impact of available funds by:

i) inaccurate identification in the appeals of the dimensions of need;
ii) improper identification in the appeals of the causes of the emergency;
iii) implementation of inadequate types of input in Somalia;
iv) insufficient control of input in Somalia.

4.7.1 Inaccurate identification of the dimensions of need

| Box 5. Summary of agency-responses to Somalia emergencies in 1992 and 1997: |
| dimensions of the emergency as presented in appeals |
| 1992/ICRC | 4,5; 1,5+3,5; 1,5; >1,0 million Somalis starving |
| 1992/DCA  | no dimens.; “thousands”; 4,5 million Somalis starving |
| 1997/ICRCa| no dimensions of flood emergency needs |
| 1997/DCAa | 800.000 affected and 200.000 displaced by floods |
| 1997/ICRCb| no dimensions of rehabilitation needs |
| 1997/DCAb | no dimensions of rehabilitation needs |
| 1997/UNHCR| 446,560 Somali refugees in the region |
| 1997/DRC  | 280,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of claim</th>
<th>ICRC</th>
<th>DCA</th>
<th>Danida</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1992</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>4,5; 17-20*</td>
<td>4,5; 20 *</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1992</td>
<td>1,5+3,5€</td>
<td>4,5; 20*</td>
<td>4,5; 60 *</td>
<td>4,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1992</td>
<td>&gt; 1,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1992</td>
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<td>60 *</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(cont. >>>>>>
The wildly differing estimates of the number of people in danger of starvation in Somalia clearly indicates three key problems with needs assessments:

i) An emergency does not count without a figure of people in need; the press, agencies, ministries etc. demand figures no matter how inaccurate.

ii) The margin of uncertainty both conceptually and numerically may be so wide as to render estimates almost meaningless.

iii) Estimates tend to be inflated over time reflecting that big numbers are better than small numbers for most parties to an emergency, except, of course, the actually suffering people.

The low ICRC estimates from July of “more than 1 million” starving Somalis seems to be the most plausible, but the degree of accuracy is impossible to ascertain, while the claim of 4,5 million starving Somalis almost certainly was a gross exaggeration.

I will argue that the over-generous adding of extra millions of starving to an emergency in an arrogant way nullifies the respect for individual suffering. It may well be done in an earnest wish to attract funds to needy people, but quite apart from generating handsome overheads, real needs of real people become endless, abstract and de-personalized. To add another million starving people just to present a really juicy fund-generating emergency is not an act of mercy but an act of de-humanizing. To do so has disturbing implications for the human rights of the beneficiaries confronted with the aid industry.

The figure of 4,5 million starving Somalis including 1,5 million in immediate danger of dying began to circulate in the international press, in NGO appeals and government donations at the beginning of 1992. UN Under-Secretary James Jonah was apparently the first to suggest the figure of 4,5 million starving Somalis in his September 1991 report to the UN on the Somalia emergency. With the unfolding tragedy it quickly became the standard figure, “blasphemous to question”. (Michael Maren) Three arguments may be advanced against the figure of 4,5 million starving Somalis.
First, the uncertainty regarding the size of the total Somali population. In 1992 the World Bank published an estimate of 8.2 million and UNDP an estimate of 8.9 million, while FAO estimated the total population to be 3-4 million. Perhaps the most thorough discussion of all available evidence is found in the Human Development Report for Somalia, published by UNDOS in 1998. Their conclusion is that the total Somali population was below 5 million in 1992 and had reached 5.52 million by 1995. (p. 41)

Second, while it is not theoretically impossible that close to 100% of the Somali population could have faced starvation it is probably not true because the area affected by food deficit was limited. The famine was mainly concentrated in the southern inter-riverine area, and not even here were everybody starving. Michael Maren points to the fact that “It would have been clear to anyone travelling beyond the immediate famine zone that the vast majority was [...] not in any danger at all. The entire population of the famine-affected areas of the country was actually only 2.5 to 3 million.” (p. 210)

Finally, the limited precision of the term ‘starvation’. Different definitions of ‘starving’ glossed over the striking difference between the estimates, but how did the actual bodily condition of a person ‘starving’ differ from one ‘in immediate danger of dying’, or ‘in need of food assistance’, or ‘facing starvation’ or from being ‘in danger of famine’ etc. etc.? And how did these conditions differ from the general living conditions of most Somalis struggling for survival in ‘normal’ years? The unqualified notions of “starvation” could lead as well to full tilt warnings like “Dying in a sea of misery” ignoring figures completely or grossly inflated figures like the exaggerated Danida figure of 60 million starving people in Eastern and Southern Africa in “the worst drought in hundred years”.

Obviously such inaccurate estimates hamper timely relief. One example quoted above was the 29 February 1992 appeal from LWF forwarded by DCA. There were no arguments of specific needs necessitating the proposed scope, duration and input of 35 flights to Mogadishu with 1 million inhabitants and serving a population of perhaps 3 million, and the surprising 20 flights to Berbera with a population of 25,000 and serving a population of maybe 1 million. No reasons were given for any of the amounts of aid proposed: why precisely 1000 metric tons, if not because it is such a nice round number? In the proposal it was just stated vaguely that “thousands of lives in Somalia are at stake” without any kind of evidence. It moved on the unstated understanding that needs anyway were much larger than the possible emergency assistance.

The 1997 flood response was an example of the opposite of the inaccurate assessments of 1992: accurate assessment (of a much smaller emergency than 1992) facilitating the planning of a well-targeted emergency relief. However, it is significant that almost no public funds were
generated for the flood relief. The sober assessments could not move the flood emergency to the top of the global 1997 chart of hit-emergencies tired of Somalia.

It is notable that no assessment of needs was made in connection with the rehabilitation/development assistance. This is a reflection of a very important and contentious difference between emergencies and development. In 1997 Somalia no longer was an emergency (except for the floods). I shall argue more fully below in section 6, that a fundamental redirection of needs-assessments had taken place from people to institutions. The needs of people living in ‘normal’ conditions however volatile and vulnerable were converted into departmentalized state-like inputs, for example in terms of primary health targets or areas of agricultural rehabilitation or programmes of education.

Finally the dimensions of the refugee-crisis were assessed very accurately in terms of displaced persons, while assessments of the rehabilitation inputs were vague and departmentalized. This reflects again, I think, the difference of assessments concerned with people-needs and institution-inputs.
4.7.2. Improper identification in the appeals of the causes of the emergency

Box 7. Summary of agency-responses to Somalia emergencies in 1992 and 1997:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of the emergency as presented in appeals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/ICRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992/DCA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997/ICRCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/DCAa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/ICRCb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/DCAb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I shall argue that the famine in 1992 was attributed in an improper way to drought by DCA and Danida. At no point did DCA or Danida put forward meteorological data to support their claim about a drought in Somalia that year. However the question is not simply a meteorological one: rainfall is erratic on the Horn, both across time and place and famine was not caused one-dimensionally by lack of rain, but by the break-down of survival strategies by civil war. Insufficient rainfall is a basic feature of life in Somalia as the Somali anthropologist Amina Warsame notes in her study of the impact of the civil war on northern nomads: “In an unpredictable arid environment like Somaliland, where the struggle to survive is predominant, adaptive strategies of coping with the changing situations have become integrated into the lives of pastoralists.” (Warsame 1992, p. 39)

Bernhard Helander, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Uppsala, one of the world’s top Somalia experts, makes the same point for the southern farmers also subjected to severely unpredictable rainfall where rains even within small areas can vary dramatically. Coping mechanisms of single family groups beyond standard measures such as storage of grains included dispersing farms/fields over several (climatic) districts and spreading family-members between environments with different income-possibilities such as refugee camps and urban areas to maximise the combined drought-resistance of the family group. Violence, however, rendered all these strategies more or less impossible.

Asked directly if the drought was the cause of the 1992 famine Bernhard Helander answered, “Absolutely not!” (personal communication, 4 March 1999). This conclusion is supported by
many researchers. “High malnutrition in Bay region in 1992/3 [the worst-hit famine area with Baidoa town] did not reflect a lack of food, but the fact that people had been harvested.” (McAskill, 1998; italics in original). “The main causes of malnutrition are disease and loss of assets... It is not a problem of food availability but accessibility; not deficit but access.” (Lagard, 1998; both cit. in Bradbury 1998, p. 112). “The floods [in 1997] were fundamentally different from the politically and militarily induced famine of 1991-93, when food insecurity was not the result of the vagaries of weather conditions but the “harvesting” of people.” (ibid. p xx).

Indeed, the same conclusion on the causes of the famine in 1992 was reached already by the reports from Somalia made in 1992 including those from LWF, inter alia Bob Koepp on 29 Feb, Adrian Ratcliffe on 10 March, and John Parker on 2 April. The ICRC never talked about a drought-induced famine in Somalia that year (Danish Red Cross only did it once, in a joint appeal with DCA and SCF-DK). Michael Maren quotes a long row of US and international press reports on the famine in Somalia from 1991-1992 (Maren 1997, p. 206-215); in none of these are there any mentioning of drought. Alex de Waal and Raakiya Omar wrote in 1993, “The famine in southern Somalia was due to raids and counter-raids by the armed factions, while north of Belet Ouen, in the north-east (Mijurtania) and Somaliland, there was no famine in any case,” (cit. in Compagnon 1998, 87).

Why then talk about a drought in Somalia in 1992? I can see two reasons, both questioning the policy of DCA and by implication Danida. The first possible reason was the less than truthful lumping together in the national campaign “Brød til Verden” in March 1992 problems in 16 African countries as one massive drought disaster. The subsequent 100 million dkk appropriation from Danida in the same manner was based on an all-inclusive claim that “[a]pproximately 60 million Africans are estimated to be in immediate danger of starvation in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.” (Danida, April 1992). This is not the place to discuss whether or not there were droughts in the other countries. The problem is to appeal for and donate money to victims of a drought in a country where there was no drought (but people starving for other reasons). That it was done in the service of a noble goal need not be doubted, but what are the consequences?

The second reason for the less-than-true claim of drought instead of civil war as the cause for the famine probably has to do with the different compassion-rate of a drought victim and a civil war victim. DCA and Danida stressed drought and down-played civil war in all their appeals and public communications on Somalia because the Somalis had to be “innocent”, a term used repeatedly in the appeals, in order to attract maximum donations from the public. People
destroying their own country provoke too many difficult questions, also about the sustainability of aid.

Yet, it can be argued: If people starved and moneys collected saved them why the fuss? First of all in the self-interest of the aid agencies: it is imperative for them to safe-guard the trust of the public, whether it is approached as tax-payers, private donors or governments. Trust is the most crucial asset of agencies doing humanitarian aid. Inaccurate reporting of the dimensions of emergencies and improper identification of the causes of famine in the case of Somalia 1992 may backfire terribly when the claims are proven to be half-truths and exaggerations. Because which claims made by the agencies in the future can the public then trust?

Secondly, and more importantly, because casting the beneficiaries as innocent victims deprive them of subjectivity and agency. The “vicitimization” extends and deepens the (unintended) de-humanization of the beneficiaries by inflated estimates of people at risk in the emergency area. The target population are cleansed of what could make it less than a perfect beneficiary. Traits are pushed out of focus that make complex emergencies complex such as local groups benefitting from the emergencies. When someone actually contributes to the destruction of their own society, how do you assist the ‘right’ people and how do you make the help sustainable? Such awkward questions are avoided by focusing on the “innocent victims” of simplified emergencies.
4.7.3. Improvident types of input in Somalia

| Box 8. Summary of agency-responses to Somalia emergencies in 1992 and 1997:  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>types of input</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/ICRC</td>
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<td>1992/DCA</td>
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<td>1997/ICRCa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997/DCAa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/ICRCb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/DCAb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In certain ways the inputs was improvident and constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid:

i) humanitarian aid could be over-size and/or not timely terminated;
ii) humanitarian aid could disregard the local capacity for self-help.
iii) humanitarian aid could continue in a questionable way as development aid;

Food aid was the main input in 1992, and it did save a lot of lives (I discuss some details below) but it is probably true that the food aid was given indiscriminately, based on exaggerated assessments of needs and without possibility for securing sustainability. Ola Skuterud, head of the IFRC Somalia delegation personally experienced this.

"If we have had the ideas of sustainability we have now back in 1992 the ICRC would have gone in less massively, not to create passivity. In Erigavo, Somaliland in 1993 I was responsible for distributing food despite I knew it was not needed and had detrimental consequences. It was political: when we helped in the South we were obliged also to help in the North." (Interview with Ola Skuterud, Nairobi 7 January 1999).

Beyond nutrition food aid is a powerful social resource. By November 1992 ICRC and WFP together claimed they provided food for 3 million people, that is the majority of the total population of Somalia. It is unlikely, however, that the claim is true in the sense that ICRC & WFP end-distributed food to 3 million people. In 1992 an executive top-level report in WFP-Rome estimated that only 15% (fifteen percent) of the delivered food reached the beneficiaries (personal communication from Steven Green, head of WFP evaluation department; Copenhagen
25 March 1999). This figure was never made public. Steven Green gave one example of what happened to the rest. At one point the WFP-stores in Mogadishu was looted and 7000 tonnes of food disappeared in 24 hours; crowds of people carried away sacks and even the militias could not loot it all themselves. “But it was probably the best distribution we ever had,” Steven Green said. Most of the 85 percent looted food would enter the market and fund faction leaders, their militias and followers, or build up the fortunes of certain rich merchants.

Quickly the words “donor” and “NGO” entered the vocabulary of everyday Somali language. In many ways the phasing out and exiting of humanitarian aid is a much more difficult problem than building up an operation because there is a compulsive growth in aid to complex emergencies. The mega input of food to Somalia in 1992 is one example; the input of transport is another example. Bob Koepp’s SEOC air-service already mentioned grew almost over-night into a multimillion dollar “monster”. Indeed the global turnover of the humanitarian aid industry grew from some 500 mill. $ to 15 billion $ in just six years (1992-1998), probably unmatched by any other industry. Even if the global volume may have peaked the volume of aid is now so enormous that when focused on a few emergencies it can be devastating. The weight of aid itself can become a constraint for achieving its objectives of long-term sustainability.

The change of UNHCR inputs from 1992 to 1997 is an example of a decade of profound reorientation from emergency towards repatriation and reintegration efforts. However, the repatriation incentives provided by UNHCR seemed to have altered the coping-patterns of refugees very little. Far more people have repatriated spontaneously without any incentives, than those repatriated by the UNHCR programmes. Peace is not induced by repatriation but peace may induce repatriation. The striking difference between spontaneous and organised repatriation is a good example of the relative insignificance of humanitarian aid, and should encourage a more realistic assessment of what it can hope to achieve. The UNHCR Nairobi performance in particular was remarkably low: only 0,79% of the target for Somali repatriation was achieved in 1997.

The inputs listed for 1997 except the flood-response, all aimed at medium to long-term rehabilitation: health, education, infrastructure, income-generation etc. Everybody wanted to do the same: build a sustainable society. This reorientation of relief has been dubbed “Programming Relief for Development” and rests on assumptions of a continuum from relief over rehabilitation to development (for an eloquent subscription to this view see the EC Somalia Unit Strategy Paper, Nairobi 1998). The notion of a continuum from relief over rehabilitation to development seems to be shared by most current thinking - and practice - of humanitarian aid. Yet it is, in my opinion, a highly problematic notion obfuscating important differences between humanitarian aid and development aid.
The argument of a “continuum” reflected that the static notion of emergency aid where you restored a situation hit by a momentary disaster back to its former balance had been shattered by complex, ongoing emergencies. When emergencies began to appear chronic it became impossible to ignore the fact that there would be no way of restoring emergency situations to their pre-disaster matrix. In this way emergency aid became development aid by default.

It is no secret that the money are much bigger in development than in emergency, and it is obviously a logical growth option for emergency agencies to move in that direction. As Erling Dessau, UN humanitarian co-ordinator and UNDP resident representative in Somalia 1994-96 remarked in a discussion, “It is no fun just to run a soup-kitchen.” With many new actors this development raises questions of comparative advantage, of co-ordination with local administrations and linkage with fully fledged development aid.

However, humanitarian aid and development aid are not parts of continuum. They have different targets. Humanitarian aid reach out to individual human beings suddenly torn out of their long-term context. Development aid targets societies, humans in their long-term context, which ultimately is the state. It is important to keep this difference in mind. Of course, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development can and should complement each other, but on the basis of acknowledged difference. In practical terms it means humanitarian aid being much more serious about how to phase out relief. The easy part of humanitarian aid is moving in; the difficult part is moving out.
4.7.4. Inadequate control of input in Somalia

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<tbody>
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<td>1992/ICRC</td>
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<td>1992/DCA</td>
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<td>1997/UNHCR</td>
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<td>1997/DRC</td>
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Ultimately the question of control of input in a complex emergency boils down to the question of violence. The key problem which could not be solved was how to protect the vulnerable groups, which all the humanitarian interventors wanted to assist, against powerful, predatory groups. It is at the most simple a triangular relation: opposing forces in the emergency area plus the intervention force (in whatever configuration of coercive and non-coercive elements). In Somalia we see all possible clashes of violence: between the forces in the area in complex shifting patterns and inconsistent relations of alliance and antagonism between the intervention parties and the local groups. A constant theme was the dissatisfaction of the international community with the Somali power holders and their never-succeeding effort to create new sources of Somali legitimacy.

After the unsolved problems of protection of a massive humanitarian intervention in 1992 (and even more acute in 1993) the tendency in 1997 seemed to be not to deliver more inputs than local power-holders could protect. This was perhaps more a matter of much reduced availability than by virtue of new insights. If a committee could protect a local IFRC health clinic it was fine, but for more valuable inputs they had to be protected by local business-men/faction leaders with their own security forces. Birte Hald, senior project co-ordinator in DCA told me after a recent visit to south Somalia (March 1999) how beneficiaries of income-generating projects asked her to keep everything at an extremely low scale not to attract the looters. As soon as the women had got their small shops etc. running militias would drive by and loot everything. Only inputs with local protection, like the example of the Mogadishu water-supply protected by an armed business-group, had any hope of sustainability. Even this was on the balance, and the
immediate beneficiaries would be the business-people, not any vulnerable IDP, woman or child unable to pay for water.

Protection as a basic problem for humanitarian aid has been succinctly formulated by Bradbury and Voltan,

“If vulnerability and livelihood insecurity are related to access, then the critical issue humanitarian agencies should be addressing is not capacity building or sustainability but protection.” (Bradbury 1998, p. 113)

This important observation may justifiably be extended to all humanitarian aid and intervention in Somalia. In the end protection means countering violence with violence. All the arrangements of control devised by the aid agencies had to confront this problem. However, no-one, not even UNITAF nor UNOSOM 1&2, wanted to go all the way to protect weak groups and rule Somalia against the will of local power-holders. Hostage-taking or killing of expatriates (including US-soldiers) would immediately bring everything to a halt. The result was unstable arrangements with elders, militias, local committees, business people and whatever could pass as local authority.
V. Constraints of the peace-inducing impact.

In this concluding section I shall try to answer the very simple and very difficult question: *did the help help?*

Throughout this report I have addressed that question from one angle only: the “peace-inducing impact” because I take peace to be the precondition for successful humanitarian aid and rehabilitation. Thus the question is: Did the humanitarian aid projects contribute to the *termination* of civil war, i.e. termination of internal attacks claiming more than 1000 casualties per year? A follow-up question even harder to answer straightforward could be: Did the humanitarian aid projects contribute to a partial termination of civil war by for example reducing the number of battle-deaths from 20,000 to 2,000?

Somalia was suffering civil war in 1992 with direct casualties from the intra-Hawie battle over Mogadishu estimated to number more than 20,000. (ICRC) In 1997 there was no such large-scale battles and Somalia did not figure on SIPRI’s list of wars. However, this was also because the type of violence had changed into a dispersed multitude of small crime-like acts. This “criminalization of civil war” is a feature of many civil wars in the 1990s which makes all counting very problematic. In 1997 there was armed violence, but no war in Somaliland and Puntland. The number of casualties had also dropped significantly from 1992 to 1997 in the south, but probably not below 1000, i.e. the continuing widespread violence meant the civil war had not ended in the south.

Was this change from 1992 to 1997 *caused* by the humanitarian input or did it happen in spite of the external input or did it perhaps occur unrelated to this? To answer this question in any definitive way, if possible at all, would demand a full exploration of Somali history, a task falling very much outside the scope of this report. I can only offer a circumstantial argument.

The humanitarian projects were not directly intended to be peace-inducing. They were designed to save lives or begin rehabilitation (generate development). However, in the complex Somali emergency there were neither protection nor legitimate rule. State power was fragmented. Therefore, to implement projects some kind of protection and some kind of legitimate rule had to be created. A state-building perspective was added, evolving from UNOSOM interventionism, over total disillusion to the present experimental caretaker state. The question of peace-inducing
impact may thus be restated more accurately: Did the efforts to save lives and begin rehabilitation contribute to the Somali state being focused or fragmented?7

5.1 Saving lives

The immediate goal of any humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies is to save lives, to reduce suffering from hunger and disease and to protect people against displacement or to support them while displaced and to help their earliest possible return to home. These are all actions prompted by the humanitarian imperative aiming at the individual human being.

Nobody has produced definite numbers on the demographic impact of the humanitarian aid to Somalia in 1992, 1997 or any other year. The baseline data are notoriously unreliable, partly because they were inflated by Siad Barre in order to attract more aid. Assessments of food production should also be treated with caution.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 10. Food production and food import in Somalia, 1000 tonnes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total food production in Somalia</td>
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<td>Total food import and aid to Somalia</td>
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<td>Total food amount available in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daily food amount available to each Somali</td>
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<td>(5 million Somalis/day/kilograms)</td>
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<td>US Department of Agriculture estimates</td>
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An evaluation of the Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium severely criticizes the focus on inputs as a sufficient measure of success. “Measuring success by input marginalises questions of relevance and effect. The result is a tendency to treat the requirement of food as either self-evident or a generalised requirement.” (Duffield 1995, p.3) This critique can be extended to all agencies: from appeals to final reports none of them have attempted to discuss the impact of their inputs beyond the most simple quantitative terms. The number of lives saved is often used as a shorthand for quantitative impact. Wounds attended to, diseases cured, refugees secured

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7 This question is based on the spatial methodology I have developed for analysis of the state in Tin 1998. Central to this analysis is the idea that the state rules social life by mediating external pressures from the global state system that there must be a state and internal pressures from every individual that life should be free. This clash of state rule and human individuality may analytically be conceived as taking place in four spaces: state space, ethnic space, town space, and house space. See the appendix for a short-hand presentation of the four spaces.
shelter, and people just suffering a little less are left out by this crude measure let alone assessment of any complex qualitative impact.

One study estimated that 202,000 to 238,000 people died from the famine in 1992. (Maren 214, quoting the Refugee Policy Group, Washington) More people died of hunger in 1992 than in 1991 despite more food being available, probably because the civil war denied more people access to food. Many researchers cite the figure of 100,000 people estimated to have been saved by the humanitarian assistance, but we do not know if it is ± 1,000, 10,000, or 25,000. (e.g. Clarke/Herbst, p. 241; Maren, 214) Michael Maren cites the Refugee Policy Group claim that only 10,000 of those lives were saved after the US Marines landed in December 1992. (Ibid, p. 214) Alex de Waal reached the same conclusion in his study of the humanitarian aid to Somalia: the military intervention launched in December 1992 played virtually no role in conquering the famine. (de Waal, 1996:140) This is profoundly contradicting the official reading of the facts.

“The most dramatic accomplishment of the United Nations... was the success in defating the famine... More than 250,000 lives are estimated to have been saved during the famine emergency.” (Boutros-Ghali 1996, p. 5)

The particular Danish contribution to the presumably most realistic estimate of 100,000 saved lives can only be guessed. Again it should be stressed that the humanitarian assistance did more than save lives, yet to the extent that the 360,000 tonnes of food aid was the key input actually saving the 100,000 lives it took an input-average of 10 kilos per day per person. The efforts of ICRC (140,000 t.) and LWF (10,000 t.) would have contributed to this; but whether this translates into equal proportions of impact, whether the ICRC saved roughly fourteen times as many people as the LWF is hard to judge. But even the ICRC only accounted for 39% of the total input of food aid. The Danish financial contribution to the massive ICRC operation in Somalia in 1992 was a modest 1,1%. Assuming a (doubtful) linear relation of food distributed and lives saved the specific Danish contribution to ICRC in 1992 could have saved 0.4% or 427 out of the 100,000 people. The total LWF operation could have saved 2777 lives; the LWF accounts does not permit a break-down of the Danish contribution.

The floods of 1997 caused around 2,200 deaths. The three week delay of the relief operation meant that few people were saved from dying as they had already rescued themselves from the direct threat of the water. Distribution of relief items such as shelter, medicine, water-treatment and limited amounts of food probably saved some lives during the November to April operation, but I have come across no estimates of numbers, and they are likely to be relatively low.
None of the rehabilitation projects of 1997 were designed to be directly life-saving. Premature deaths may have been prevented by vaccinations, sanitation, treatment in health clinics, but outside of an emergency it is difficult to talk of lives saved.

What was the peace-inducing impact of the massive food aid? A key measure is the difference between the amount of locally produced plus imported/donated food available, and the food accessible in terms of money and violence. Access is a question of power and violence. An example of the difference between availability and accessibility was the internal WFP evaluation revealing, as we have seen, that 85% of all food aid were looted or otherwise removed from WFP control and not delivered to the intended beneficiaries. I will argue that the input of food and other resources did entrench social polarization and fragmentation of the state.

The reason is simple. The inputs to save lives, predominantly food, were injected into the most dispersed units of power and violence: the house spaces or fragmented families, individual refugees. In theory food aid was given directly to needy people. But in practice neither the humanitarian agencies nor the beneficiaries could control the food. Little or no protection was possible from within these units and the enormous resources floated upwards looted by larger violent units, typically the militias.
Poor people unable to buy the looted food on the market would loose out, militias and other violent groups and individuals would strengthen their hand. For young half-educated men the emergency aid operations were a golden period with many opportunities which led to serious weakening of traditional social control. Denial of access to local resources, i.e. looting of stocks, forced labour, depopulation of fertile land etc. compounded the ravaging effects of food aid. The looted food would be eaten eventually, but it represented first of all an enormous source for feeding the local war-economy.

Soup kitchens opened by many NGOs, in particular ICRC, as a way of reducing looting became a very attractive supplementary way of tapping the aid-wealth for powerful Somalis. They invested in kitchens and kept competitors away with guns. Throughout the famine Somali business-men were able to supply the ICRC kitchens (feeding at one point one million people) with all firewood, salt, sugar, vegetables etc. used by the kitchens, procured on a still functioning Somali market. Business-men were also able to buy monitesized relief food, but the scheme soudered because WFP found no way of re-injecting the huge sums into the Somali economy.
Pouring more food into this unnatural and corrupted economic system would do more harm than good without a dramatic change in the security situation,” Andrew Natsios, a top USAID man in Somalia 1992 and advocate of food-monetization wrote and he concluded, “Perhaps the two objectives of decreasing violence and increasing nutrition were mutually exclusive in the absence of a disciplined security force.” (in Clarke and Herbst 1997, p. 85 & 91)

Following the argument of Bradbury and Voltan, quoted above, that it was lack of protection rather than lack of food due to natural causes that created the famine of 1992 it can be concluded that the humanitarian aid was unable to attend to the most pressing need of vulnerable groups. The riverine Bantu farmers in particular could not defend their houses against militias looting or demanding forced labour. Helping people in feeding centres and refugee camps saved lives but not houses, not the livelihood of the starving people. Indeed the Hawie occupation of Bay and Bacool to a large degree responsible for the continued violence was not addressed by the humanitarian aid nor the military intervention.

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**Interview with Ola Skuterud, head of the IFRC Somalia delegation, Nairobi 7 January 1999.**

“In the fall of 1993 my delegation paid a monthly rent of 5000 $ to one particular Somali. He owned several houses and received a monthly income of 80,000$. He had money to pay a large militia. In this way we helped to create a warlord. In 1993 we paid 34 mill. cfr for running our clinics in Garowe. In 1998 we paid 2 mill. cfr for the same number of clinics. We have stopped providing any aid if it is not supported by the local community. They must be a partner. In Garowe we said they must donate a house if they want a clinic. We struggle gradually to reduce the dependency. They must develop ways of cost recovery.”

“If a new hunger catastrophe broke, what would happen? Let us be frank, the lion’s share would go to the warlords. We help to keep the war going. But if we stopped aid, would all the little people stop the war?”
Interview with Walid Musa, Senior Adviser, Political Affairs and Governance, European Union, Delegation of the European Commission Somalia Unit, Nairobi, 7 January 1999.

Walid Musa, former adviser to Mohamed Sahnoun and UNDP considered the humanitarian intervention in the South as, “- successful measured against the prime objective, to save lives. After the military intervention one was able to control the banditry making logistics successful. How much peace it contributed in that era? The answer is zero. The focus was on saving lives - without regard for the damage to peace. The Danish contribution was part and parcel of other contributions, it had no way of being an individual one. It did save lives, but it did not contribute to peace. In Somalia there was a genuine need but no genuine will to peace. People are dying and you cannot say I’ll not save the life of this person lest there is peace.”

5.2. Generating development

I take it that the premiss underlying rehabilitation aid, “relief programmed for development”, is that development promotes peace while poverty leads to conflict. Yet, I shall argue that there is little evidence to support the idea that development promotes or secures peace. Development may be a good thing in its own right, but it should not be confused with action for peace.

Rehabilitation and development inputs into Somalia were injected into spaces with very fragmented structures of rule and violence. Either they went to house space through corruption, looting, militia extortion and occupation, or they fed into violent town space struggles between factions backed by rich merchants fighting to control airports, harbours, and other key assets in a trade-based economy with no industrial production. This was worst in the south where, for example, violence still in 1999 kept the harbour and the airport of Mogadishu closed. After fighting Puntland leaders were by 1998 sharing taxes from the Bosaso harbour, the main source of revenue in the north-east, and in Somaliland key business-men and politicians had worked out a deal over Berbera livestock export, telecommunications, qat-trade and other valuable town space assets.

Rehabilitation and development projects were mostly programmed to be injected into town space. Denmark’s development inputs before the war, for example, consisted of urban electrification, harbours, fishing industries, wind mills, health and water infrastructure (see box 11 below). A seed improvement project and a sand-drift project both aimed at commercial
farming, which in the context of Somali social structure benefited urban land grabbers. Rehabilitation inputs after the war were also driving Somali urbanisation.

Protection of the rehabilitation/development inputs were out of step with their disruptive potential. One example was the UN agency Habitat. It tried to build up a capacity of rule in the Somaliland municipalities. They worked on town-planing, institution building, infrastructure, water delivery management, and revenue collection, but stumbled on the fact that violence determined allocation of the resources in the absence of a unified state. They could thus only work in a few towns in the north and not at all in the south.

Interview with Dan Lewis, head of Habitat, Hargeisa, Nairobi 7 January 1999.

“‘The Somaliland system is top-down. All what the ministers want is to put money in their pockets. We try to support a bottom-up approach, but there is no elected mayors.’”
“Boroma was just a black hole, all money disappeared. We have withdrawn from working with the Boroma municipality. UNICEF donated 600,000 $ four years ago to health; nothing came out of it, and now they want to donate money again. Humanitarian aid is just a cash cow.”

Danmark’s engagement in Somalia’s development dates from 1980. During 17 years Denmark assisted the people of Somalia with more than half a billion Kroner or 6 dkk to every Somali continually for 17 years. (This excludes the assistance to the 10,000 Somali refugees living in Denmark) 63% of the 532 million dkk was donated as development aid and 37% as humanitarian aid. Most of the development aid was given before the civil war began and all the humanitarian aid after the war began. The Danish development aid was only part of an enormous input of aid to Somalia in its period as an ally of the West during the 1980s. In the end of this period 60% of the total Somali state budget was donated from the outside and 100% of all development activities. The aid bankrolled the gross corruption of Siad Barre’s regime and was partly responsible for the resentment provoking the civil war. It should not be ignored, however, that the Siad Barre dictatorship created a less terrible poverty than the warlords...

None of the Danish development projects in Somalia survived the civil war; for example Danish windmills continued to be put up after the civil war had begun in the north-west, eventually, when the war spread they were all torn down by looters and sold as scrap. The unjust distribution of development projects and the tangible wealth they represented, all favouring Siad Barre’s rule and town over country-side, was one factor behind the war. Now Denmark, in a small way, has begun development aid the Somalia again. Why it should promote peace more successfully this time is hard to see.

There appears to be no unequivocal correlation between absolute level of human development and war. Indeed, there is little evidence to support the idea that development secures peace. While it is true that more poor countries are at war than rich countries, most poor countries are not at war while a number of rich countries are at war including some of the world’s richest countries involved in wars outside their own territory. SIPRI, publishing probably the most authoritative quantification of wars, in 1994 listed 25 countries at war. The richest was the UK and the poorest Afghanistan. The UNDP Human Development Index divide all countries into three groups, high, middle and low. 8,1% of the countries with a high Human Development Index were at war on their own territory (if peace-keeping operations etc. were included the percentage would be significantly higher); 17,1% from the middle group were at war; and 18,1% from the low group. At the same time 44 countries from the low group were NOT at war. There is no level of development which rules out war.
To argue that a higher human development as defined in the H.D.I. would secure peace for the ten poor countries at war seems a questionable proposition. What amount of development would be needed? Even if all African countries saw development to, for example, the middle group (where only a few African countries like South Africa and Algeria are ranked at present) the percentage of countries at war would only drop from 18,5% to 17,1%. Development as a route to peace appears to be very long indeed.

It may then be argued that it is not the absolute level of development, but relative change, that is progress within each country which may secure peace. It is the “middle-class argument” maintaining that a prospering propertied class will have a vested interest in stability, law and order and peace. Unfortunately the middle-class is not particularly peaceful. During the last two hundred years, that is the epoch of the nation state, the European states with large middle-classes were by far the most war-prone among all the world’s states. In Somalia the emerging middle-class of business-men are profiteering, not suffering, from the violent fragmentation of the state. As one happy business-man said to me: “Somalia is the world’s largest taxfree shop; here a business-man can do anything!”

The “middle-class argument” often comes in a negative variant, that significant drops in living standards increases the risk of (civil) war. However, it is a general phenomena that a war-torn country is poorer when the war ends than when it began (a rare exemption is USA after World War II which is explained by the fact that no destruction took place in America). To the extent there exists any significant relation between wealth/poverty and peace/war it seems to be the opposite of the “economic development = peace” proposition: war is more likely to break out when a country is rich and end when the country is exhausted and poor.

After six years of conflict the Human Development Index of Somalia had dropped dramatically from an index of 0,221 in 1989-90 to an estimated index of 0,184-0,159 in 1995-97, that is to the absolute bottom of the world. If the drop had instead been a rise Somalia would now have attained the development level of Nepal. Yet, the eruption of a heavy weapons civil war equal to the one ravaging the country from 1988-92 is highly unlikely today. A drop in development has lead to an increase in peace.

There appears to be no unequivocal correlation between absolute human development level and war and little evidence to support the idea that development secures peace. Development may be

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9 The leading expert on the Somali business-class is Roland Marchal; see his well-documented The Post Civil War Somali Business Class, Nairobi: European Commision/Somalia Unit, (September 1996).
a good thing in its own right, but it should not be confused with action for peace. My conclusion is not, let me repeat, that development (projects) inevitably causes war, but that neither the opposite statement is true: that development as such causes peace.

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<tr>
<th>Box 11. Danish development and humanitarian aid to Somalia 1980-97 (dkk)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Danish development aid to Somalia 1980-97:</strong> 334.2 mill. kroner</td>
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<td><strong>Total Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia 1980 - 97:</strong> 198.313 mill. kroner</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980 (- 1989) Seed-improvement project 15.4 mill. /implemented by FAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981 (3 March) 45 mill. Bilateral loan to improve harbour-facilities and fisheries</td>
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<td>1982</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983 (- 1988) Sand-drift control project 11.4 mill. /implemented by UNSO</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984 (- 1989) Vindpower electrification project 33.3 mill. /implemented by UNSO</td>
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5.3 Conclusion: focusing the Somali state

Above I narrowed down the problem of the peace-inducing impact of humanitarian aid to the question: Did the efforts to save lives and to begin rehabilitation contribute to the Somali state being focused or fragmented? A fragmentation would favour civil war, while focusing would favour a termination of civil war. When I talk about ‘focusing’ the Somali state, the first question is: which Somali state? and the second is: what can drive it into focus?

5.3.1 Which Somali state?

There was no state in pre-colonial Somalia. In Somali tradition no focusing of power beyond ethnic space is legitimate. As I.M. Lewis wrote, “Although the Somali people had a strong sense of cultural and linguistic unity, they did not form a single political unit. They were a nation, not a state, although they possessed all the prerequisites for effective statehood...The most stable unit in a flexible and shifting pattern of alignments was the ‘diya paying group’. This consisted usually of a few hundred male heads of families who were parties to a joint treaty or contract (heer) to pay and receive compensation for injuries and death or, in default, seek revenge.” (p. 25) In a nation state compromises defusing group violence are reached under the state’s monopoly of violence. Somali nomadic society was the opposite: no monopoly of violence and no compromises. Taken as a whole it was a very durable and resilient social structure. Yet compared with a state is was a paradox of stable instability.

It can also be argued that the first Somali state-structures were alien colonial impositions on nomadic, republican Somali society. The British colonial and military administrations were confined to a handful of officers ruling with askari troops through the top of Somali tribal society. Beyond strategic, regional concerns the only goal was to keep the area reasonable peaceful. Where Gerald Hanley erred in his entertaining description of Somalia during British Military Administration was that modernity would eradicate tribalism.10 On the contrary in modern, independent Somalia even towns were violently divided into tribal areas.

In the 1950s a tiny Somali national elite was fostered by the Italian and British colonial powers to man the future independent state. The career of Mohammed Farah Aidid is a good example of this. Born in 1934 as fifth out of 13 children to nomadic parents near Belet Weyne he was privileged to get an education. He later got a job with the Italian colonial police, moved up through the ranks and was eventually sent to Italy on NATO military education. He returned at

the time of Somalia’s independence as a key player in the small circle of men from the police and military establishment ever since competing for the spoils of Somali national power.

The Somali nation state did not originate in a local grassroots-urge, but in pressures from the state system. Independent Somalia acquired legitimacy by default, by being that which was not Kenya, Ethiopia, nor Djibouti. Somalia was that territory which was not Kenya, Ethiopia nor Djibouti;Somaliland today is that territory which is not Puntland, Ethiopia nor Djibouti. To uphold such territorial divisions between own state space and foreign state space a rough equilibrium of inside and outside forces is needed. Somalia unsuccessfully tried to extend the international borders to incorporate parts of the Somalian diaspora in Ethiopia and Djibouti in armed conflicts in 1960-61, 1963-64, 1976-77, 1977-85 and 1987.

According to I.M. Lewis the peaks of Somali nationalism were reached at independence in 1960 and with the Ogaden war in 1978 (until Siad Barre lost it). Apparently independent Somalia never was a viable state, but kept floating by outside subvention. Somalia after Barre very often has been described as a “state-less” society (e.g. by Boutros-Ghali). This is, however, inaccurate. The business of rule has not disappeared, it has fragmented. Most of the present warlords were part the previous state elite. They have been extremely successful in monopolizing power, while they have fought bitterly amongst themselves. The fighting since 1991 did not produce new national leaders, but confined the powerbase of all would-be presidents to their individual clans.

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Abukar Ali Sheikh, DBG, Mogadishu

“It is true it is a clan war. Before, when there was a government clans fought over water and wells. Siad Barre used the national budget to pay for his clan. The last eight years is has been political, looking for a president. People are intermingling in Somalia. I do not believe Somali clans hate each other. But politicians used their militias to shoot someone from the clan that are challenging them. Then they have to separate into safe areas.”

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Walid Musa, European Commission, Nairobi

“Somalia is essentially a clannic society. In Somalia today there are two ways to go, either a total division of the country into clannic divisions, or some kind of arrangement that will put it together satisfactory to all of them. Mechanisms of co-existence among clans requires a substantial amount of time. During the totality of Siad Barre’s time this process was stopped. It
is going to take 10-20 years. Yet, that is nothing in the life of a nation. Somaliland is the model today in dealing with clannic society, but it is still a single clan territory, the Issaq.”


“We Somalis are tribal. We have to live with it without letting it destroy us. The politicians are the problem. Go to the tribal elders. Without the consent of House of Elders we can do nothing. It is the way the British ran the country.”

“In Erigavo I spent four months speaking with all the clan militias in order to set up a local administration. I sat under the trees and discussed with them and their demands to our government. It is a grassroots approach. They must use this in the South. We never took part in the international conferences. Why should we talk with the warlords? They represent no constituencies, only a hundred militias. They must bring their house in order before we can talk with them. We are in no hurry.”

“To secure the peace in Somaliland is our most important objective. We use 65% of our budget on paying salaries to 15,000 militias to keep them under control. We do not need a big army, we do it to protect ourselves against the militias. We would like to form a national army and police and demobilize the militias. We could retrain those with school education as teachers, and rehabilitate schools; 5000 could teach 150,000 pupils!”

“Somaliland is not a tribal entity like Puntland. It has historical colonial borders. We are an experiment for all Somalia. Up to now no system was devised that could deal with the tribes. They can compete economically. But they must share something - a state. If we cannot do it - then God bless Somalia!”
5.3.2. Four alternatives for focusing the Somali state

If the first paradox of present Somalia was the stable instability of clan society focusing almost all violence and power, the second paradox is the external pressure to make the Somalis preserve a unified Somalia state space of the international community’s own invention. Two different geographies clash in ethnic space. One is the traditional permanently shifting and negotiable terrain of clan influence, the other is the fixed territories of nation states reflected inwardly in provinces, districts, capitals etc. Walid Musa shrewdly observed in his strategy paper for the EU Commission that practically everyone dealing with the socio-political situation in Somalia whether from the inside or the outside has accepted the Siad Barre district and regional mapping of 1973 as their main geographical reference. With the collapse of all national authority the real existing political formations, largely following pre-colonial tribal congregations and traditional clannic influence, have in ever deepening fashion superimposed clannic territory upon the existing Barre regional map of Somalia.

Neither the national borders of Somalia, nor the inner borders have been washed away. Ethnic-clanic violence has not produced sustainable borders of their own, that is producing a territorial reflection of ethnic-clannic purity. The conflicting claims over Sool and Sanac districts by Somaliland and Puntland is an example of this: nobody wants to divide the districts along clan lines; they must go undivided either to the state to the west or to the east.

During the last ten years four alternatives in dealing with the fragmented Somali state from the outside has been attempted.
Box 12, Somali state alternatives, c. 1980 - 1999

1) *Protectorate* or trustee-ship under military administration; suspension of national sovereignty for a prolonged period of several decades. This is the *Bosnia update of British Military Administration.*

2) Outside sponsored *top-down* state building of the Siad Barre model. The nation state recreated on the basis of a national army sponsored by outside power(s).

3) Local *bottom-up* state building with minimal outside involvement. Small-scale infrastructure and services. International containment, restricted refugee reception.

4) State of an *experimental* type. The alternative of a minimal, federal state with radical freedom for local entrepreneurs, internationalized social service and unresolved problems of violence.

Fig 3.

External input to build a nation state >>>

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<tr>
<th>State space</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic space</td>
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<td>Town space</td>
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<td>House space</td>
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The focusing of power has reached an impasse in ethnic space. In December 1992 many people believed that UNOSOM would cross that point by using violence.

Interview with Matt Bryden, War Torn Societies Project UNRISD, Hargeisa 22 November 1998.

“I saw it. When the force came everyone was euphoric. The first day was spectacular. The helicopters chased the technicals (improvised heavy weapons of the militias). People believed it was raw power. UNOSOM could have arrested the warlords, but the Americans did not want casualties. From the very first day the forces were tested by the militias and made to react in an unpopular war. The militias won. Then it was “bring elders, women, NGOs”, anyone as an alternative to the warlords. It was ridiculous, apart from those that got direct humanitarian aid UNOSOM only empowered the warlords and rich merchants. It was a wrong attempt. It was totally alien with no reference to Somalia’s history.

UNOSOM never amounted to a protectorate because there was no hegemonial power desiring (the US) or global authority able (the UN) to implement this alternative. Whatever the much discussed details for the failure of UNOSOM, it is safe to say that no-one is going to propose a protectorate in Somalia in the foreseeable future.

A chance Danish input into the Somali state space suddenly found itself in the cut-throat politics of outside sponsored top-down state building. Pressure from the right-wing parties on the Socialdemocratic government in 1997 on the issue of Somali refugees in Denmark made it a priority to strike a deal with a Somali authority. Somaliland was the only area of Somalia found to be safe for returnees, thus the problem of rejected asylum seekers only became relevant here. For the Somaliland government linking recognition and returnees was one of the very few ways to put any kind of pressure on the outside world. Somaliland openly saw official agreements on refugees and aid as a kind of de facto recognition, something Denmark did not. However, Denmark went far in linking the return of rejectees with pledges of development aid, but recognition was studiously left hanging in the air.

From the confidential communication in the Danish Foreign Ministry it transpires how sensitive the whole affair was. A dispatch from the Danish UN mission in Geneva on the reaction to a formal agreement with the Somaliland authorities pointed out that “several of the consulted countries considered the topic highly sensitive...” and it was stressed that no public reference could be made to the answer of the consulted governments. In a meeting with Danish officials the EU special representative for Somalia Mr. Sigurd Illing said that, “The recognition by a European country of the independence of Somaliland would have detrimental implications for
the general development in Somalia.” It was reported to the Danish Ministry that the OAU was strongly opposed to recognition, and UN in New York advised that Denmark should not enter any bilateral agreements with Somaliland (or Puntland).

However, Danish recognition of Somaliland’s independence could have made a real difference. If other countries followed suit it would seriously had weakened the claim for a united Somalia, and by implication the claim for unity of several other African countries. Denmark had no wish to do that, and with only an incidental Danish interest in Somalia and no long-term policy for the region it was natural to follow the advise of UN, OAU etc. On the other hand, it demonstrated where Denmark (and other states) could effectively influence peace in Somalia.

The alternative of a top-down state, based on a national army sponsored from the outside, demands super-power interest, an (unlikely) regional agreement, or war giving one regional state the power to determine the future of Somalia. Unfortunately, the permanent geo-political conflict of Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile water seems to keep Somalia constantly destabilized. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has increased even more the value for Ethiopia of a separate Somaliland (and Puntland) and access to the harbours of Berbera and Bosaso, thus further dimming the hopes of peace in Somalia.

All the peace-conferences sponsored by the UN and others have been counterproductive for two reasons, partly because they have built upon faction leaders themselves benefiting from conflict and disunity with no genuine wish the build peace, and partly because they have not been all-inclusive, with Ethiopia sponsoring one set of factions and Egypt sponsoring another set of factions. There is no unity of purpose amongst Somalia’s neighbours to recreate a unified state, and no other external pressure (comparable to the cold-war geo-politics) to do so. Ethiopia supports Somaliland and the break-up of Somalia. Egypt and Libya for the same reasons support a unified Somalia, and they paid for the 3000 strong Benadir police force as a step in that direction.

Walid Musa, European Commission, Nairobi

“I can confirm to you that the political destiny of the South today is not up to the Somalis at all, it is shared by external factors. Today two very strong external players are calling the shots, Egypt and Ethiopia. The political destiny of Somalia is not in the hands of the Somalis at all. Full stop.”

Ever since the departure of Barre the outside world has tried unsuccessfully to produce new national leaders of Somalia. Civil society persons, women, professionals, business-men, elders,
traditional leaders etc. have all been supported without even remotely challenging the power of the men with guns. In the foreseeable future it is unlikely that a national leader can focus the power of Somalia. Somalia could continue indefinitely as small ramshackle state-fragments. States beyond the region may reduce their involvement to the absolute minimum and keep out Somali refugees. This would be the global city shutting out the global countryside and the “failed” states.

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I asked if local leaders could contribute to the recreation of government?

“We support our traditional authorities, the judges, the district commissioners, our security forces, and our sultan; we solve local problems ourselves. We are the base, we solve the basic problems of Somalia. Somalia should be one and united. We should not say good-bye to Somaliland. We share the same language, the same culture. What we see from Hargeisa is a bargaining game. Hargeisa want to gain when Somalia is united again. Egal wants to be the president of Somlia.”

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Interview with Ali Salad Hassan, senior Programme Officer, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 6 January 1999

“Who are the people that can claim legitimacy? Aid organisations speak of civil society etc. but that is putting the cart before the horse. Civil society gets looted, it has no protection of its own. It is militias creating security that will gain legitimacy. Egal brought all the militias of Somaliland together, paid them and defused conflicts without violence in Hargeisa Airport and Burao. In this way he won legitimacy. The only solution is to work with the people with guns, the warlords and the faction leaders.”

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At the moment many functions of a Somali state is taken care of by international agencies in Nairobi. For example UNDOS sees itself as a doing the job of a Somali ministry of planning, (Gian Paolo Aloï, Operations manager UNDOS) the IFRC Somalia delegation performs services eventually to be provided by a Somali ministry of health, (Aisha Omar Maulana, Delegate, Somalia IFRC) and the EC Technical Assistance sees itself as contributing to a bottom-up state creation (Vasilis Petridis, EU Somalia Rehabilitation Programme). This list is very long. The Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body tries to co-ordinate the work and in many ways perform the tasks of a government.
But there are at least two crucial differences. As I said above, the Somali state has not disappeared, it has fragmented. Thus the Nairobi caretaker state is an addition to the multiple state-fragments in Somalia. There is a very clear division of labour between the two sides. SACB provide state service: health, education, infrastructure etc. while the state-fragments rules violently. Violence is out of the hands of SACB.

The second difference partly follows from this. SACB has no democratic mandate from the Somali population. For UN agencies it is strange not to have a state-counterpart. Instead they produce a letter saying local groups support the project in question (Larry de Boice, UNDP Deputy Director, Emergency Response Division). People in Somalia naturally wants to have access to state-provisions like water, health, infrastructure, education etc. The rehabilitation and development focus material resources in state space. But not violence. SACB cannot provide protection of their inputs beyond agreements with various state-fragments. They cannot guarantee the access of vulnerable groups to the services, they cannot secure sustainability.

This is an experiment with a new form of state. It is a state which do not build on nationalism or nation-building in the form we know from the last two hundred years including the first generation of independent African states. Potentially it could develop a formula for radical power-sharing with smaller (clan) entities inside and larger (international) entities outside the national border, which may overcome the perennial nation-state problem of ethnicity not matching national territory. How far the practice of the caretaker administration in Nairobi will take it is impossible to tell. How it will be developed by the Somalis is hard to know. But it is without doubt the only initiative suggesting a peaceful way out of the impasse of ethnic space.

Walid Musa, European Commission, Nairobi

“In my personal view, the extent of democratic exercise going on in Somalia is unmatched anywhere in the world, today in Somalia as long as you can protect yourself you can say, do and implement what you want. Absolute democracy, uncontrolled democracy, the advanced stage of freedom! Somalia by the virtual absence of a state for 8-9 years is giving an example to the rest of the world that the [national] borders system established before may be correct in most cases but not in all of them and it needs to be reviewed. Full stop. This is what Somalia is saying today to the world, the international community. This is what Somalia is contributing to the international world order.”

He paused, and added,

“The problem is to pay for such an demonstration. Everywhere the solution began with the creators of war. The solution must begin from the warlords. Creating a system which they
themselves will not survive. When tranquillity returns to Somalia it will be a controlled tranquillity. A system in which in its ways of control will be more or less like Siad Barre.”
5.3.3 The result

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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>ICRC, famine</td>
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<td>DCA, famine</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>ICRC, rehab.</td>
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<td>ICRC, floods</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBG, rehab.</td>
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<td>DCA, floods</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR, repat.</td>
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<td>DRC, rehab.*</td>
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* no war in Somaliland in 1997

The result is not impressive. Humanitarian aid alone is not able to induce peace. It will have to be linked with efforts to focus the violence of the state. The DBG project in the chaotic south Somalia situation should be noted. Alone among the reviewed projects the well trained and highly motivated local DBG staff was able to give their inputs acceptable local protection. This is important in order to make the experimental internationalized state work. It may be objected that when DBG co-operated with a local state power that excluded women or business-men that denied poor people unable to pay access to services DBG induced peace at the unacceptable price of marginalizing the very groups Danida tries to help. However, the sample presents no better alternatives. The UNHCR and DRC projects in Somaliland also had local protection, but unlike in the south it was focused by a fragile bottom-up state, and thus the situation demanded less inventiveness on the part of the humanitarian aid agencies than in the south.

Lives can be saved in complex emergencies by timely humanitarian assistance. However, this assistance will quickly feed the destructive structures aggravating complex emergencies. It is imperative not to sustain the humanitarian assistance beyond the immediate emergency. Agencies should make it a priority to find ways to terminate aid; in particular avoid yielding to pressures by conflict constituencies to perpetuate aid.
To be a beneficiary of the services provided by rehabilitation/development projects was fully comparable to winning in a lottery. The winners were happy, but they were very few. The local structures of violence giving or denying individual Somalis access to the lottery were almost impossible to touch for the donors. Inputs given to vulnerable groups provoked looting; only small-scale inputs given to privileged groups with arms did not initiate new violence. The result was extremely low sustainability of the services and grossly inequitable access to them.

The paradox of present Somalia is the inner strength of clan society focusing almost all violence and power, and the external pressure to preserve the state space of Somalia. Peace in Somalia has to begin in ethnic space.
Appendix: People consulted.

Copenhagen/Europe
Rage Mahamed Haji Rage, Chairman, “Det Somaliske Folk i Danmark”
Stephen Green, Evaluation Department, WFP, Rome.
Larry De Boice, Deputy Director, UNDP Emergency Response Division, Geneva.
Bryan Deschamp, Senior Special Adviser, DOS-UNHCR, Geneva.
Bernhard Helander, Insitute of Social Anthropology, Uppsala University.
Holger Bernt Hansen, Centre for Africa Studies, Copenhagen University.
Lennart Skov-Hansen, DanChurchAid, Head of Relief Dept.
Birte Hald, DanChurchAid, Relief Dept.
Tina Hansen, DanChurchAid, Somalia Desk
Marianne Halberg, LWF/Mekane Jesus, Addis Abeba
Bjørg Elvekær, International Relief Dep. Dansk Flygtningehjælp
Anne Dorthe Helmich, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, Asylum Dep.
Jeanette Lindved Madsen, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, Informationskonsulent,
Siri Melchior-Tellier, Head, Int. Dept. Danish Red Cross
Carsten S. Mahnfeldt, Dansk Røde Kors , International. dep.
Jens Weise Olesen, Head of Section, Danish Immigration Service
Johs. Dahl-Hansen, UM, S 4
Niels Severin Munk, UM, S 3
Ellen Buch Hansen, UM, Danidas evalueringsenhed
Henrik Grunnet, Nordisk Film TV
Kirsten Larsen, DR1 Orientering

Hargeisa/Somaliland
Mohamad Saeed Mohamed Geez, Minister of Planning, Rep. of Somailand
Mohamud Salah Nuur, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rep. of Somailand
Ali Sheik Mohamed, IFRC, Consul General of Denmark, Norway and Sweden
Edna Aden Ismail, Edna Aden Maternity Hospital, Hargeisa
Ibrahim H. Ahmed, Hargeisa Orthopaedic Workshop, IFRC Norcross, Somalia
Kelif Issa Yusef, Managing director, Damal Airlines
Jama Aden Omar, Owner, Kulmiye Factory
Faaduma Yusuf Cisman, Chairman, Hargeisa Women’s Milk Co-operative
Halima Ali Ibrahim, Vice-chairman, Hargeisa Women’s Milk Co-operative
Fawzia Yusuf H. Adan, Hargaisa University Committee
Matt Bryden, Programme Coordinator, War-Torn Societies Project, Somali Progr.
Guido C. Ambroso, UNHCR, Field/Repatriation Officer
Helga Griffin, Programme Manager, DRC Somaliland Rehabilitation Programme

**Mogadishu/Benadir, Middle & Lower Shebelle**
Abdi Qeybdiid, Police Commissioner of Benadir
Ali Hussein Alio Ebrou, District Commissioner, Qorioley
Abdulllahi Dhagoweye, Afgoye Wellfield Coordination Chairman
Abdi Mohammed, Principal, Iman Malik School, Mogadishu
Hassan Nur Hassan, acting Governor of Middle Shebelle
Mohamad Osman, Police Commander, Jowhar district
Abukar Sheik Ali, Programme Coordinator, DBG Mogadishu
Abdullahi Ali Hassan, Project Officer, DBG Mogadishu
Osman M. Mohamoud, Project Assistant Officer, DBG Mogadishu
Mohamoud M. Kheyre, Administration Officer, DBG Mogadishu
Ahmed Mohamud, European Commission Liaison Officer, Mogadishu
Mohamed Mohidin Ali, Editor-in-Chief, Panorama Weekly Newspaper, Mogadishu
Jürgen Prieske, Director, Diakonie/Bread for the World, Mogadishu
Carlos Ugarte, MSF-Spain, Head of Mission, Mogadishu

**Nairobi/Kenya**
Walid Musa, Senior Adviser, Political Affairs and Governance, Delegation of the European Commission, Somalia Unit,
Vasilis E. Petrides, TA/EAC-Somalia Rehabilitation Programme
Ola Skuterud, Head of Delegation, IFRC, Somalia Delegation
Aisa Omar Maulana, IFRC, Somalia delegation
Vivi Pedersen, IFRC, Somalia delegation
Robert G. Koepp, LWF, International Relief and Development Consultant
Bodil Holmsgaard, DanChurchAid, Regional Rep, Northern/Eastern Africa
Henrik Jespersen, Royal Danish Embassy Nairobi, First Secretary (Development)
Dennis Lazarus, UNDP Somalia, Deputy Resident Representative
Ali Salad Hassan, UNDP Somalia, senior Programme Officer
John Spring, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi
Gian Paolo Alo, UNDOS, operations manager
Kalunga S. Lutato, UNHCR, Head, Somalia Operations
Dan Lewis, HABITAT, Somaliland, Head of mission.
Ashok, Export Trading Co.
Appendix: State space, ethnic space, town space, and house space.

Section 5 above is based on a model of four spaces: state space, ethnic space, town space, and house space. Together they frame human identity; any human being in a nation state is simultaneously present in all four spaces; for example as a Dane, a Jew, a Copenhagen’er, and a woman. The four spaces may be described in the following terms (quoting my PhD-thesis The Spaces of Civil War. From a global typology of civil war to a topography of violence in South Africa, 1976, 1986, 1996, University of Aarhus 1998. pp. 157-159):

“In a nation state I suggest we will find four super-imposed topographies or spaces: the individual person is living simultaneously in a state, an ethnic space, a town (or rural non-town), and a house (in whatever shape: high-rise, tent, palace, long-house etc.) What is defining the four spaces are their respective relations of human body and space. Let us assume we could freeze all the world’s borders of states, ethnic spaces, towns, and houses at a given point in time: all these borders drawn and re-drawn by violence (‘unwanted physical interference with bodies’) taken together would constitute the global topography of state rule and resistance to state rule. The point about this general statement is to emphasize the duality of any particular border: any spatial border will represent the conflict of state rule (ultimately originating in the state-system) and resistance to state rule (ultimately originating in the human individuality).

The relation between state and body is pragmatic: practically everybody living on the state territory are citizens, members of the state-nation. It is an inclusive relation: nation follows state. Outside the state are the other states, the global system of states. At the end of the day, the pragmatic relation is pro-active: we are what we can to let our state win.

The relation between ethnic space and body is essentialistic, forged by the belief in a determinant essence of the body: ethnicity, faith, decent, language, or historic mission, constituting the chosen community; only the pure bodies belong on ‘our’ soil. Outside the ethnic space are the aliens, the enemies; ultimately a global structure of we and all the others. The essential relation is not pro-active, but retro-active: we are what we believe we were.

The relation between body and town-space is functional: Bodies are related to non-town by the functions of growing food and to town by the functions of appropriating, accumulating, and diversifying food. The functional relation is not pro-active nor retro-active, but active: we are what we do.

Finally, the relation between body and house-space is organic. Belonging to the house are the bodies ordered as patriarch, wife, children, and slaves. The categories of the house refer to
biological differences revealed at marriage, birth, and capture, and defined by society as gender, generation, and race; they are applied to all house-members, not just the nuclear family. Outside the house is the wilderness. The organic relation is in-active: we are the family.

Ultimately, all four topographies are global: any particular state is only one element in a planetary system of states; any ethnic space is surrounded by the world of others; the towns of the world are differentiated from the countryside of the earth; any individual house is alone in the wilderness stretching from one end of the horizon to the other.”

A short presentation (in Danish) can be found in my Magtens rum: staten, stammen, byen og huset, [The Spaces of Power: the state, the tribe, the town, and the house], workingpaper 42-97, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, 1997; and a discussion of one space is attempted in my The Slave, the Native, and the Serf: Three Sites of Violence in the South African Ethnic Space. Workingpaper 59-98, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, 1998.
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